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I. INTRODUCTION
Australian defense historically^ has depended on a "great and power-
ful friend". Prior to World War II there was little need for Australian
interest in defense matters, since defense efforts in Australia would
only duplicate British defense of its colonial interests in Southeast
and East Asia. The collapse of Singapore and Malaysia quickly changed
the Australian antipathy for defense matters. The United States, with
interests of its own in the Southwest Pacific, rescued Australia from
probable Japanese occupation and replaced Great Britain as the "great
and powerful friend". Australian efforts to insure its security grew
into the "Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United
States of America ('ANZUS' Treaty)". Since it was ratified in 1952,
it has formed the cornerstone of Australian defense.
As a result of the British decision to withdraw from East of Suez,
and the expectation of the United States that nations in the Pacific
do more for themselves militarily (Guam or Nixon Doctrine), Australia's
strategic environment has changed substantially. The changes in British
and American policies have been paralleled by changes in Australian
policy. While Britain and the United States were in Southeast Asia,
Australia was there also because of its "Forward Defense" policy.
VThile the major powers were containing Communism, Australia was at-
tempting to meet the enemy as far away from the continent as possi-
ble. When Britain and the United States left the area, Australia's
defense policy shrank in scope to one of continental defense.
As the powerful friend's policies toward the Far East changed,

Australia's policies tov/ard its "Near North" also changed. As the
British and American presence in the area departed and declined respec-
tively, Australia had to cope with the problems of defending its secur-
ity in the South Pacific/Indian Ocean. Attempting to come to grips
with its position in the new balance of power in the region, Australia
has used several catch-^v/^ord identifiers to describe its defense policy.
These identifiers not only have not always defined the real force
structure but have generated arguments as to whether Australia has ever
made an actual strategic assessment and then developed a strategy based
on this assessment.
The colonial attitude, of allowing the "great and powerful friend"
to direct defense matters, has been difficult to shed. Australia does
not have an abundance of strategic thinkers but, as a regional leader,
has been forced to develop a defense strategy that is equivalent to its
perceived position in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia power
calculus. Australia is a nation the size of the United States and has
a population comparable to the New York metropolitan area, and must
therefore develop a defense policy that can be supported by its limited
financial and technological bases. My thesis is that Australia has
developed a defense policy capable of realization.
When considering Australian defense, three premises must be con-
sidered. First, Australia is a vast, underpopulated and underdeveloped
continent with a coastline of nearly 12,000 miles. Defending Australia
against attack would be difficult, if not impossible, and very costly.
Second, nearby there are countries of dense population and resource
requirements that understand the potentialities of Australia. Lastly,
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This paper will comprise an investigation of Australian attempts
to direct security strategies during World War II, its efforts to
develop collective security for post-war Southeast Asia, its period of
forward defense and relationship to ANZUS, SEATO, and the Five Power
Arrangement, and its current attempts to establish a realistic
corps-force. The methodology of investigation will be broad and
descriptive. Since the time span will be nearly forty years, no attempt
will be made to deal v/ith individual governments, with the exception
of the Labor Government from 1972-1975. This government will be
singled out because of the effect it had on the defense structure and
the strategic debate. The thesis v/ill view the thrust of Australian
defense policy and how it has met perceived defensive needs.

II. THE COLONIAL APPROACH
As a part of the British Empire, the defense of Australia was largely
a concern of the British Government. Australia became a Commonwealth
on January 1, 1901 and in the years that followed it continued to look
to Whitehall for its security.
In 1921, Imperial Far Eastern strategy was based on a battle fleet
operating from Singapore. This strategy was confirmed at the 1923
Imperial Conference but no joint plans for the defense of Singapore were
made and the "Australian armed services were not developed according to
2
this strategy concept."
Between 1923 and December 1941 Australian public opinion, and to a
lesser extent official opinion, believed that their security rested
mainly on British naval strength. Since Australian security depended
on a powerful British fleet that would steam to Singapore in an emer-
gency, it naturally followed that Australia's contribution to the strate-
gy would be naval forces. In 1936, the minister for defense stated that
"The objectives of the Government's defence policy are the maintenance
of the R.A.N. [Royal Australian Navy] at a strength which is effective
and fair contribution to Imperial naval defense and local defence against
3invasion and raids." "The Government's policy [was] that the Navy is
4to be Australia's first line of defence."
In the five years preceding 1939 the Australian defense budget was
seventeen million pounds. The Army and Air Force budget was seven
6
million pounds each leaving only three million for the RAN budget.
This defense expenditure made sense only if the British fleet arrived
10

at Singapore when an emergency occurred because the RAN was equipped
to be only an augmentee force. If the RAN had no British fleet to
7
augment, the Singapore strategy would cease to be viable.
The major flaw in the strategy was that it did not consider that
Great Britain might become involved in a two-front war and would be
unable to send a battle fleet to Singapore, which was essential to
Australia since its fleet was designed as an augmentation force. When
Australian officials questioned the viability of the Singapore strategy,
they were normally lulled into a false sense of security based on British
promises to develop Singapore to accomodate the British Main Fleet.
Since the success of the Singapore strategy was vital to Australian
security, they tended to accept at face value the claim that the trans-
Q
fer of British naval power v/ould be almost automatic.
Great Britain felt that Singapore's geography was its main defense
and its development was therefore slow. It was felt that a lot would
have to happen before Singapore was seriously threatened. When war
became imminent in Europe, it became obvious that British interests in
Europe and the Middle East would come before Singapore and that Britain's
9
Navy would be unable to operate both east and west of Suez.
A major power will aid an ally only so long as it is in its best
interest to do so. When Australia looked to Great Britain to make the
Singapore strategy function. Great Britain needed all its resources to
defend Europe and the Middle East. Australia might have realized what
would happen to Singapore when threatened by the Japanese because, in
May 1939, the Admiralty had sent an officer to the U.S. War Plans
Division to inform the United States that "owing to the necessity of





In 1941, at the Arcadia Conference held in Washington, the United
States and Great Britain agreed on a strategy for the war. The con-
ferees noted that "much had happened since February last, but not with-
standing the entry of Japan into the War, our view remains that Germany
is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory. Once
Germany is defeated the collapse of Italy and the defeat of Japan must
follow." It was agreed "that only the minimum of force necessary for
the safeguarding of vital interests in other theaters should be diverted
12from operations against Germany."
At the same conference, the proposal to establish a unified command.
in the Southwest Pacific was adopted. Australian Minister of External
Affairs H.V. Evatt saw the need to create an Allied command in the Pacific
theater so that efficient allocation of resources and the quick decisions
13
could be made. Australia believed that each of the Allied countries
should have some sort of impact on decisions, but Australia was not a
conferee and, therefore, had little impact on the decision to create
the Allied command.
The Conference set up the Australian-British-Dutch-American (ABDA)
Command. The Australians had wanted an American commander for ABDA but
the command was given to Lt. Gen. Sir Archibald Wavell of Great Britain.
The U.S. did not want the command because it considered the ABDA area
14
unsalvageable and didn't want the responsibility. The ABDACOM direc-
tive to the Supreme Commander dated January 3, 1942 from the Arcadia
Conference stated:
"The basic concept of ABDA Governments for the conduct of the
war in your Area is not only in the immediate future to maintain as
many key positions as possible, but to take the offensive at the
earliest opportunity and ultimately to conduct an all out offensive
against Japan. The first essential is to gain general air superiority
12

at the earliest possible moment, through the employment of concentrated
air power. The piecemeal employment of air forces should be jninimized.
Your operations should be conducted as to further preparations for the
offensive. "^^
This step was taken by the United States and Great Britain without con-
sulting either Australia or the Netherlands. To the conferees the action
would also be in the interest of Australia and the Netherlands and there-
fore consultation was not important.
The Government of Prime Minister Curtin had been active in both
Washington and London trying to get reinforcements and to raise the
Pacific priority. The American and British responses were viewed as most
unsatisfactory. Neither were able or willing to deploy naval forces to
16
the Pacific to ensure that Singapore be retained. Prime Minister
Curtin instructed Ambassador Casey, Australian Ambassador to the United
States:
"Please understand that the stage of gentle suggestion has now
passed. . .this is the gravest type of emergency and everything will
depend upon a Churchill-Roosevelt decision to meet it in the broadest
way."^''
The following day Prime Minister Curtin appealed publicly to the
United States for immediate military assistance. It had became obvious
that none would be coming from Great Britain. His controversial state-
ment symbolized Australia's determination to act independently of Britain
to protect its security interests. Curtin 's appeal read, in part:
"We look for a solid and impregnable barrier of the Democracies
against the three Axis powers, and we refuse to accept the dictum
that the Pacific struggle must be treated as a subordinate segment of
the general conflict. By that it is not meant that any one of the
other theaters of war is of less importance than the Pacific, but that
Australia asks for a concerted plan involving all the greatest strength
at the Democracies' disposal, determined upon hurling Japan back.
"The Australian Government therefore regards the Pacific struggle
as primarily one in which the United States and Australia must have the
fullest say in the direction on the Democracies fighting plan.
13

"without any inhibition of any kind, I make it quite clear that
Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional
link or kinship with the United Kingdom.
"We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces. We know
the constant threat of invasion. We know the dangers of dispersal
of strength. But we know too that Australia can go, and Britain can
still hold on."^^
Curtin's statement was an unprecedented p-ublic assertion of Dominion
autonomy and was aimed primarily at promoting immediate and substantial
American assistance. Australia realized that its defense policy had
been built around a strategy that required British participation and
that Britain did not at this time see it as imperative to participate.
As the ABDA Command took form the need for American assistance
became obvious. ABDA had to reconsider its programs immediately because
19
of the swift Japanese victories in insular Southeast Asia. The appar-
ent British disinterest in Southeast Asia brought an indignant cable
to Churchill from Curtin on January 23, 1942. The evacuation of Singapore,
he argued, would be regarded in Australia as an "inexcusable betrayal".
"We understood," he stressed, "that it [Singapore] was to be made im-
pregnable, and in any event capable of holding out for a prolonged
20
period until the arrival of the main fleet." The main fleet did not
arrive and the ABDA Command was dissolved shortly after it was estab-
lished, after the area it had been formed to defend had fallen to the
Japanese (Gen. Wavell flew to Colombo on February 25, 1942 and ABDA
Command ceased to exist)
.
On February 15, 1942, Singapore fell to the Japanese and the Singapore
strategy that had formed the backbone of Australian defense was broken.
Threatened by a Japanese invasion of their country, the Labor govern-
ment imposed universal conscription. Lt. General Vernon Sturdee, Chief
of the Australian General Staff, recommended that the forces in the
14

Middle East be recalled to defend Australia. As he saw it, Australia
was now the only satisfactory strategic base to organize an offensive
21
against Japan and must be kept secure.
With the imminent fall of the Philippines, the Pacific required
a base from which to carry out successful military operations against
the Japanese. The greater its own manpower, industrial capacity, and
raw material resources, the less vulnerable it would be to enemy attempts
to interrupt its lines of communication. Australian lines of communica-
tion are so located that a major fleet action would be required to inter-
22diet them. If the allies were to have mastery of the Pacific, Australia
was a necessity. For these reasons the United States began to rapidly
build up its forces in Australia.
A. WORLD WAR II
When the fall of the Philippines became imminent, Washington began
to think about where to put General MacArthur. Under the existing cir-
cumstances, a new command was needed and President Roosevelt ordered
MacArthur to Australia, which had become to the Pacific what Great
23
Britain was to Europe for mounting a counteroffensive. Australia now
enjoyed new stature in the American Pacific strategy, and replacement
of the British defense system in the Far East was begun.
The outward appearance of the help coming from the United States
gave the Australians the feeling that the Americans would rescue them
from their apparent peril. Actually, Lt. Gen. Sturdee had accurately
foreseen that Australia was the only satisfactory base in the Pacific
24
and the Americans were coming to ensure its security. Even after the
United States realized that Australia must be secured in order to defeat
15

the Japanese, Australia could not communicate directly with the United
States concerning policies or strategies for the Pacific. Prime Mini-
ster Curtin was unaware that General MacArthur was coming to Australia
25
or that a new command would be established in Australia.
On March 6, 1942, General Marshall informed Lt. Gen. George Brett,
Commanding General of the U.S. Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA) , that:
"It appears probable that General MacArthur will land in Australia
on March 17. Until that time you are to keep this entire matter one
of profound secrecy."
"The following instructions to you from the President. General
MacArthur has been instructed to telegraph you at Melbourne immediate-
ly upon landing in Australia. Within the hour you will call upon the
Prime Minister or other appropriate governmental official of Australia,
stating that your call is made by the direction of the President.
You are to notify the Prime Minister that General MacArthur has landed
in Australia and has assumed command of all U.S. Army forces therein.
You will propose that the Australian government nominate General
MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific area, and
will recommend that the nomination be submitted as soon as possible
to London and Washington simultaneously."
By moving General MacArthur to Australia, the U.S. had presented Great
Britain with a fait accompli . No one the British might send to Australia
could rank a man of MacArthur 's stature, and he would obviously require
a large theater to command. By the "Australian invitation". General
MacArthur became the Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific area
and the United States assumed sole responsibility for the war in the
.^. 27Pacific.
Australia, attempting to get a larger voice in Pacific strategies
and policies, felt they had more leverage now tliat their nation was
the foundation of the Pacific counteroffensive. The United States viewed
Great Britain as its principal ally and accepted Churchill as the legit-
mate spokesman for all Commonwealth countries. Dr. H.V. Evatt went to
Washington to pressure the United States into forming a Pacific War
16

Council in Washington. Dr. Evatt's successful campaign made Australia
feel it would have a more direct voice in the direction of the Pacific
War.
The Council began weekly meetings in April 1942, but these were
less than the Australians had hoped for since they were only advisory
and had no part in deciding strategy. It did give the Australian and
New Zealand members contact with President Roosevelt each week and the
28
opportunity to learn what he was thinking, and perhaps influence him.
The council did offer a direct communication line with Washington that
replaced the previous route through London.
Despite occasional pronouncements to the contrary, the Australian
government was never satisfied with the Pacific War Council. In Septem-
ber 1942, Dr. Evatt tried to defend it by telling Parliament that
"important matters on the political side and to some extent on the mil-
29itary side are finalized at the Council". In the absence of a satis-
fying Pacific War Council, Australia continued to press for expanded
representation on top level military staffs, but experienced little
success.
B. THE AUSTRALIAN-NEW ZEALAND AGREEMENT
Since the 1930 's, when Australia foresaw Great Britain's inability
to provide an effective defense for the Commonwealth in the Pacific,
it had courted the United States as a possible replacement to provide
security. Out of strategic necessity, Australia and the United States
established a direct military relationship. It was reminiscent of
Australia's relationship with Great Britain, in that the major power
would deploy Australian forces but would not give the Australian
17

government a voice in their utilization. This had been acceptable when
security arrangements were not something about which the Dominions
should worry.
The frustrations of World War II brought a change in attitude. Now
Australia demanded a voice in the decisions that might determine its
fate. As the tide turned against the Japanese, the Australians began
to look less and less at military questions and by late 1943 the occupa-
tion of Japan, control of Pacific territories, and postwar security began
to dominate relations between Australia and the United States.
Historically, Australia was an element of the British Commonwealth
security system, but World War II provided a rude awakening to the merits
of that system. They now realized that specific regional interests did
not necessarily coincide with the broader aspects of Great Britain.
After turning to the United States to fill the security vacuum that
Great Britain left in the Pacific, Australia also discovered regional
differences with the United States.
The Australian government learned that Great Britain could not ade-
quately protect the interests of the Pacific Dominions. This occurred
because the interests of the European and Pacific theaters were often
contradictory and also because British policy was often subject to mod-
ification during negotiations with the United States. The U.S. policy
was normally one of self-interest and the Pacific Dominions did not
belong to her.
The exclusion of Australia from a series of inter-allied strategic
conferences during the war, culminating in its omission from the vital
Cairo conference in November 1963, was perhaps the impetus that caused
the Labor government to act as an independent sovereign, taking steps
18

to ensure Australia's future security and political independence.
Australia felt that its right to be heard in foreign affairs should
be based on its efforts and wartime contributions. In World War II
through August 1944, Australia had had 83,000 casualties and about 12.4
percent of its population was in the armed forces. The RAN had fought
from Murmansk to New Guinea. The RAAF had air squadrons in Great Britain,
and had served notably in North Africa and the Middle East. Australians
comprised the bulk of the land forces in the Nev; Guinea campaign of
30
1942-1943. At the Cairo conference, the conferees (United States,
Great Britain, and China) agreed that all territory seized by Japan after
World War I would be permanently removed from her control. This decision,
which directly affected Australia's postwar security interests in the
Pacific, only served to heighten the growing belief that the United
States was determined to dictate postwar arrangements for the Pacific
area.
It is against this backdrop that actions taken by Australia for its
future security must be viewed. Having been left out of all the major
decisions, Australia and New Zealand began to feel uneasy about Ameri-
can desires for the postwar Pacific. In January 1944 members of the
Australian and New Zealand governments met at Canberra to formulate
resolutions on their basic objectives.
The resolutions of this conference. The Australian-New Zealand
Agreement, grew out of the war experiences of the Anzac nations. Cer-
tain features had their origins in the pre-war period, but these were
given real form after the Pacific v;ar had demonstrated the tenuous qual-
ity of the assximptions underlying Australian security. W. Macmahon




"1, That the British fleet and its Singapore base were no longer
effective guarantors of Australian security.
2. That the United States now constituted the greatest single
force in the Pacific.
3. That the security of Australia was inextricably linked with
the security of all Southeast Asia.
4. That Australia and New Zealand must act together in all matters
of common concern.
5. That Australia, by virtue of its wartime contributions and
achievements, had newly acquired rights and obligations,
among which was the right to a full and active role in plan-
ning the peace. "^-^
The driving force behind the conference was Dr. Herbert V. Evatt.
He had been the principal voice for Australian interests in Washington
during 1942-1943. His style of international relations had legalistic
overtones due to his background as a lawyer and as a justice on the
Australian High Court. After the conference began, Dr , Evatt suggest-
ed that the resolutions should be drafted in the form of a treaty. The
New Zealand representatives were unsure of the legality of dominions
signing a treaty. Research by Australian officers found no obstacles
32
to a treaty signed between two dominions. The importance of this treaty
was that two dominions had made "independent decisions on matters of
major political and international importance in which Britain and other
dominions were vitally concerned and 'formally took a position vis-a-vis
33
the United Kingdom and other dominions as well'".
The signatories agreed to a "maximum degree of unity" through con-
tinuous consultations on common issues. Clauses 7 through 12 were
directed at Great Britain and the United States and clearly showed
Australia's total dissatisfaction with its relationships with the major
20

powers. The clauses declared, in part, that the interests of Australia
and New Zealand "should be protected by the representation at the high-
est level on all armistice planning and executive bodies." They ex-
pressed the desire to "participate in any Armistice Commission to be
set up." These provisions signalled a determination to foster a region-
al stability and cooperation and thereby limit possible area domination
by any of the great powers.
The agreement was a regional pact and was worded so that it could
fit into any international charter drawn after the war. The two states
agreed that "...within the framework of a general system of world
security, a regional zone of defense comprising the Southwest and South
Pacific area North East of Australia to Western Samoa and the Cook
Islands" would be established. This clause defined what in the postwar
years was to become the area that comprised the forward defense strate-
gy that would meet any threat before it could reach the shores of
Australia or New Zealand. Also of significance was clause 16, which
recognized that the "principle of international practice that the con-
struction and use, in time of war, of naval or air installations, in
any territory under sovereignty or control of another Pov/er, does not,
in itself, afford any basis for territorial claims .. .after the conclu-
sion of hostilities".
United States Naval authorities, and some congressmen, interpreted
the agreement as a blatant attempt to deny America ' s postwar use of South
Pacific bases, including Manus Island where expensive base facilities
had been established after 1941. A congressional subcommittee, estab-
lished in 1944 to investigate America's postwar base needs, was in part -
34
a reaction to the agreement.
21

C. I4ANUS ISLAND CONFRONTATION
As the war drew down, the United States reviewed its defense plans
in the Pacific. Its strategy was designed around a line running through
35
the Hawaiian Islands, Micronesia and the Philippines. The Navy would
protect this line of communication from main fleet bases to the north,
and main and secondary fleet bases to the south of the line. Bases
guarding the southern flank were of the utmost importance because they
provided protection for not only the southern flank but also for Australia
and New Zealand.
The Naval Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives saw
Manus Island as important in the postwar strategy because of its stra-
tegic geography, excellent harbor facilities, and size (it was large
OCT
enough to be defended by land forces). At the time of the Committee's
hearing on Pacific bases, the United States had at least $71,000,000
37invested in Manus. The figure however eventually reached $155,000,000.
The problem with this strategic prize was that it was an Australian
mandate
.
Since Manus belonged to Australia, and the United States wanted
to use it as a main fleet base, Australia attempted to make the United
States participate in a broad regional security agreement, or at least
a tripartite defense arrangement, in accordance with Clauses 26 and 27
of the 1944 Australian-New Zealand Agreement. America's participation
in such an agreement would be a quid pro quo for long term base rights
on Manus. The United States insisted on bilateral negotiations on
Manus. The first terms proposed to the Australian government were, in
John Dedman's (minister for Defense, 1946-1949) words a "little short




expect the USSR to make to one of its satellites."
The proposal was basically that Australia would maintain the exist-
ing facilities on Nanus at her own expense and utilization of her own
manpower. The United States would give Australia a 99 year lease to its
installations built there, subject to four conditions:
1) The United States would be given joint-user rights, but not be
coinmitted to maintain any forces on Manus.
2) The United States had the right to deny the use of the facility
to third parties which included British Commonwealth countries.
3) The United States could at any time during the 99 years, assume
complete control of the installations for as long as she felt it
necessary.
4) The United States could prevent, if she wished to do so, the
39
establishment of any other bases in the mandated territory. \
To accept this proposal would have denied Australia any flexibility
in its defense policy. The first condition would have required Australia
to maintain the caretaker force and to pay the bills involved. This
would require either higher taxation on a small population or else a
reduction in the defense appropriations being spent on other naval
items, or both. Even if Australia bore the entire cost, it could not
develop other facilities in its mandated territory without U.S. approval.
If Australia were to engage in a war with Indonesia, New Zealand could
not operate from Manus to help Australia v/ithout U.S. consent. An even
worse option would be for Commonwealth countries to be involved in hos-
tilities in v;hich the U.S. was not a belligerent. Under such circum-




The U.S. conditions would^ in effect, make the U.S. instead of
Australia the sovereign on Manus. Rather than suraraarily dismiss the
U.S. proposal, Dr. Evatt attempted to turn an infringement of Australian
sovereignty into a proposal that would increase Australia's security.
The Australian-New Zealand Agreement blocked Australia from ceding
any territory to the United States for use as military bases, but
Dr. Evatt told the National Press Club that Australia "would be willing
to grant the use of bases if the country that occupied them would accept
responsibility for the security that those bases protected." He also
stated that the Australian Navy and Air Force should be entitled to
40
use U.S. bases as a reciprocal agreement. Australia felt that the
reciprocal use of bases should be done in conjunction with a regional
defense arrangement for the Pacific. Dr. Evatt was attempting to use
the U.S. question of postwar use of Pacific bases as a back door entry
41
to his regional defense issue.
The United States eventually was willing to concede a reciprocal
base utilization with Guam being mentioned, but was not interested in
42
a regional defense pact for that part of the world. For the 'FY 1947
budget, President Truman cut $550 million from the Navy's budget and
dismantling of American bases in the Pacific began. A large portion of
43
the material at Pacific bases was sold to the Nationalist Chinese.
As a result of these actions, there was nothing for the two nations to
discuss.
There are two schools of thought about the postwar status of Manus
Island. One is that Dr. Evatt pushed his idea too hard and as a result
the U.S. Naval budget was reduced to cut South Pacific expenditures.
The other is that Dr. Evatt had nothing to do with the budget cut.
24

with Australia secure, the United States area of interest shifted to the
North where the problems of Camnrunism were taking on greater importance;
then President Truman cut the Naval budget because the U.S. simply
could not afford the strategy originally planned for that part of the
world. Either way, the budget cut excised the issue on which Dr. Evatt
might have been able to capitalize and integrate the United States into
a regional defense pact.
D. trmnIsition to peace
The abrasive disagreement between the United States and Australia
over Allied strategic priorities and consultation arrangements remained
unabated over the counteroffensive in the Pacific and the peace settle-
ment with Japan. If Australian criticism was muted during 1942 and
1943, it was because Australia was a small power and could not risk under-
mining the relationship with its principal ally. However, Australia's
criticism of the United States became sharper when the war in the Pacific
went better for the Allies.
The Labor government was determined to emerge from the war as a
regional leader and this would be accomplished by its participation in
the counteroffensive and the occupation of Japan. There was a problem
in that the United States was a Pacific regional power also. Australia
welcomed United States influence in the postwar Pacific, but wanted the
collaboration of Allied states that contributed to Japan's defeat.
Through this, Australia hoped to influence the terms of the Japanese
surrender. After 1944 the United States' perspective of the Pacific
was shaped by broader considerations.
The war years sapped Great Britain's military and economic strength
but developed those of the Soviet Union. The principal consequence of
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the change in the distribution of power among the Big Three would be
an emergence of Soviet influence in Europe and Asia. "In estimating
Russia's probable course as regards to Japan", the U.S. Military Staff
advised the Secretary of State:
"v/e must balance against assurances as we have received from Russia,
the fact that whether or not she enters the war, the fall of Japan
will leave Russia in a dominant position on continental Northeast
Asia, and, in so far as military power is concerned, able to impose
her will in all that region. ""^^
The decline in British influence in the Pacific gave impetus to the
increase in Australian political and military initiatives. Since Australia
could not promote regional interests or influence U.S. policy for the
Pacific while acting independently, it sought to sustain British Common-
wealth authority and influence Commonwealth policy for the Pacific.
In this manner, Australia could promote specific political objectives
during future peace negotiations.
The Truman administration was anxious to restrict Soviet influence in
the Far East and to avert Soviet-American friction in the occupation of
Japan, so it held to its unilateral domination of operations in the
Pacific. The United States had to hold fast to this unilateral domina-
tion or concede that the Commonwealth countries played a significant
enough role to be principals in the peace settlement. To do this would
have restricted the United States' ability to pursue its strategic objec-
tive with Japan. In July 1944, the U.S. Military Staff warned:
"After the defeat of Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union
will be the only military powers of the first magnitude. . .VThile the
U.S. can project its military power into many areas overseas, it is
nevertheless true that the relative strength and geographic position
of these two powers preclude the military defeat of one of these




The United States would, therefore, have to look to China and Japan to
counterbalance Soviet influence. Having Japan as a counterbalance would
require rebuilding her as rapidly as possible, which was in total opposi-
tion to Australian desires.
Throughout the transition to peace, Australia's largest fear was the
possibility of a resurgence of Japanese expansionism. This fear was
consistent with the traditional white Australian concerns and security.
Australia viewed Japan as a principal enemy and not as a potential ally
against possible Communist expansion in Asia. Australia was quite un-
concerned about the possibility of Soviet postwar expansion and even
sided with the Soviets against the U.S. on some of the peace settlement
issues.
E. ARMISTICE AND ANZUS
The first articles of the Australian-New Zealand Agreement to be
tested by big power politics were those relating to armistice negotia-
tions. The two governments had agreed that "their interests should be
protected by representations at the highest level on all armistice
planning" and should "actively participate in any armistice commission
to be set up" (articles 7 and 10) . When European armistices were nego-
tiated these claims went unheeded. The texts of the Rumanian, Bulgarian,
and Finnish armistices show that the three Allied powers (the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States, and the United Kingdom)
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acted "in the interests of" and "on behalf of" all the United Nations.
Dr. Evatt spoke out bitterly about the European armistice negotiations
saying that "The major powers purported to act 'in the interests of ""~^




In the Allied Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, each signatory
state pledged itself not to make a separate armistice or peace with the
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enemies. Dr. Evatt believed that "this declaration was clearly broken
whenever armistices were signed by the major Allied powers without the
express authority of the Allied powers at war with that particular Axis
country."^ Australia and New Zealand were almost completely excluded
from the Japanese settlement as they had been in Europe. The United
States continued its wartime leadership monopoly in the Pacific by
determining the form and content of the Japanese surrender terms.
The Potsdam Declaration, which set the terms for the Japanese surren-
der, was announced without consultation with Australia. Dr. Evatt
argued that the Declaration "was of fundamental importance to Australia,
yet our first knowledge both of its terms and its publication came from
the Press." The Declaration did not call for the surrender of the
Japanese government and emperor, but rather requested that the govern-
ment "proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed
forces." In light of its contributions to the war as well a near
neighbor of Japan, Australia felt it should have been considered a prin-
cipal in the settlement, and bristled for not having been so considered.
To placate Australia it was allowed to participate as an independent at
52Japan's surrender in Tokyo Bay.
While the Allies v/ere discussing control policy for the occupation,
the Truman administration published its "Initial Post-Surrender Policy
for Japan", prepared jointly by the State, War and Navy Departments.
It said in part:
"Although every effort will be made, by consultation and by consti-
tution of appropriate advisory bodies, to establish policies for the
conduct of the occupation and control of Japan which will satisfy the
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principal Allied powers, in the event of differences of opinion among
them, the policies of the U.S. will govern. "^-^
Australia initially intended to send a force to participate in the
occupation, but Dr. Evatt was able to convince Prime Minister Chiefly
(Chiefly replaced Prime Minister Curtin when the latter died in 1945)
that a Commonwealth force commanded by an Australian would be better
for Australian interests since this could be done, whereas an all-Australian
force probably would not have been approved by the U.S. Cin terms of
the total Allied Pacific effort) . The commonwealth efforts were suffi-
cient to justify Commonwealth participation in the occupation of Japan.
From the beginning of the war, Australia tried to formulate a defense
policy for its security. After the fall of Singapore, Australian forces
were recalled from the Middle East to defend its territorial integrity,
then coming under great stress. It realized that Great Britain's
national interest lay in defeating "Hitler first", not helping Australia.
As the Japanese swept toward Australia, the U.S. sent aid because it was
necessary that Australia be secure.
The United States sent some troops to Australia because of Austra-
lia's insistence on help in defending its territory. This was in strict
compliance with the "safeguarding of vital interests" policy of the
Arcadia conference. The U.S. was not so much aiding Australia as pro-
tecting its own vital interests in the Pacific. When it became evident
that Australia v/ould be the base for the counteroffensive, the Australian
government pressed harder for a voice in defense policy. It could
press only so hard because Australia was so dependent on U.S. military
power. Due to its dependency on U.S. power more times than not, Austra-
lia would accept terms that were totally unsatisfactory to its perceived
interests in the Pacific.
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Australia did make' gains with the U.S. throughout the war but they
never really amounted to very much unless the Australian and the U.S.
goals were identical. The Labor government, looking to a postwar
security plan, promoted the Australian-New Zealand Agreement of January
1944 to show the world that Australia was an independent nation with
regional aspirations that should be integrated into a general framework
for peace.
Australia had done its utmost to influence the Japanese surrender
agreement because Japan was considered the threat of the future. With
the U.S. unilaterally directing the occupation, Australia was again
relegated to the role of making the best of the situation and being
critical of U.S. policies when necessary. Because Australia could not
secure any postwar security guarantees, the Labor government sought help
where it could find it.
It continued to push for a Pacific Pact and meanwhile make the ANZAM
agreement with New Zealand and Malaya. This quickly lost its significance
for Australian security when Great Britain was preoccupied with its
postwar economic problems, weakened influence over the Suez Canal, and
evacuation of the sub-continent.^^ Gradually the fear of Japan was
replaced by the threat of Communism.
In 1949 the Free World faced startling accessions of Communist
parties. East Europe fell to Communist governments, a Nationalist-
Communist movement was waging \\rar against France in Vietnam, the Commu-
nists assumed power in mainland China, and Malaya shared a Communist
insurrection. It was against this threat of Communism that prompt action
was required because it would be years before Japan could rearm.
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The Labor party was confronted by a dilemma in the 1949 national
elections: they sympathized with the revolutionary socialist movements
of Asia but it was these movements that appeared to threaten the security
of the area. The Liberal-Country coalition party came to power in Decem-
ber 1949 on a platform that included anti-Communism. The new Liberal-
Country government, like its predecessor, sought a regional security
arrangement but, in the absence of one, began to take action to defend
Australia. In 1950 Australia began compulsory military service. The
new military members received training in either the Navy or the Army
and then became a part of the Citizens Force or reserves for four years.
To avoid a volatile political issue, however, conscripts were not to
serve outside Australian borders.
Australia had long sought a Pacific Pact with a major power to pro-
vide its security. The British Dominion connection had always been a
sort of all-purpose alliance. The U.S. viev/ed its alliance structure
as being erected against the threat of Communist expansion and its aim
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would be to confine that threat. While ANZUS made the Japanese peace
settlement a little more palatable because it would protect Australia
and New Zealand from a resurgence of Japanese expansionism, it also was
congruous with the Dulles containment philosophy. In 1950, Australia and
New Zealand had followed the United States' lead and not recognized
the People's Republic of China, a deviation from British policy. This
was a dramatic step, aligning Dominion policy with the U.S. rather than
with Britain.
On April 23, 1951, John Foster Dulles told the U.N. Association of
Japan that the U.S. "does not intend to abandon Asia and is taking posi-
60five steps to build a multipower security arrangement." Mr. H.P. Breen,
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one-time Permanent Head of Department of Defense Production, in arguing
for a developed defense policy, said that Australians "feel that since
they are of the West, they will be saved by that association, in any cir-
cumstance." It was argued that ANZUS might not be necessary because
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the U.S. would always help Australia if help were needed.
The Liberal-Country government differed from the Labor government
in that the former saw the menace of East Asia as Coimnunist China, not
Japan. It was also more attuned to the U.S. desire to allov/ Japan to
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regain its industrial power. It, like Labor, feared a resurgent Japan.
The ANZUS Treaty facilitated Australia's acceptance of the Japanese
peace settlement which displeased Australian politicians and diplomats.
The ANZUS Treaty was created to "strengthen the fabric of peace in the
Pacific area."
The first comprehensive foreign policy statement of the Liberal-
Country government was made by Mr. Percy Spender, Minister for External
Affairs, to the Australian House of Representatives. He stated:
"I have emphasized how essential it is for Australia to maintain
the closest links with the United States of America for vital securi-
ty reasons. But, our relations with the United States go further
than that. We have a common heritage and tradition and way of life.
During the war we built up a firm comradeship with our American friends.
This friendship must, however, never be taken for granted. We propose
actively to maintain the official and personal contacts 'and inter-
changes which resulted from the urgent needs of a common military
effort.
"Indeed, so far as possible, it is our objective to build up with
the United States somewhat the same relationship as exists with the
British Commonwealth.
. .That is to say, we desire a full exchange of
information and experience on all important matters, conceive our
interests to diverge from those of the United States and consultation
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III. THE FORWARD DEFENSE STRATEGY
A. MILITARY ALLIANCES
Beginning with World War II, Australia began to involve itself more
in Asian affairs, particularly in Southeast Asia. At the first postwar
meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, Australia obtained the co-operation
of Great Britain and New Zealand to promote a regional security pact
for the Pacific area. Early in 1947, Dr. Evatt delivered a postwar
statement of Australian foreign policy and listed as the fourth objective
"the development of a system of regional security in co-operation with
2
the United States and other nations." The establishment of NATO in-
creased Australian desire for a regional pact encompassing the Southeast
Asian and Pacific areas.
ANZAM (Australia, New Zealand and Malaya) was the first postwar
security arrangement to protect a strategic area. The Malayan area con-
tained the South-East Asian approaches to Australia and New Zealand and,
after the war, the two dominions knew they could not leave its defense
in the sole hands of Britain.
The ANZAM arrangement was not a treaty and had no treaty commitments.
Sir Alan Watt stated that ANZAM was "At one stage... a more-or-less
classified word never mentioned in public by officials." It was, how-
ever, an arrangement between Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand
that aimed at the insurance of British Commonwealth security in South-
East Asia.** In 1956 the Royal Institute of International Affairs stated
that the three nations
"...agreed to co-ordinate defence planning in an area known as the
AJ^JZAll region, which includes the Australian and New Zealand homelands
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and the British territories in Malaya and Borneo, together with the
adjacent sea areas. ANZAM planning was at first limited to the defence
of sea and air communications in the region, while co-ordination was
conducted at Service level and did not involve firm commitments by
the Governments concerned. "5
Even though ANZAM served regional security interests, Australia wanted
more - the inclusion of the United States in a security arrangement.
The United States was reluctant to enter into a Pacific regional
commitment until that reluctance was modified by the Communist revolu-
tion in China and the Communist threats to the Korean Peninsula and
Southeast Asia. In April 1951, President Truman announced that the
United States was willing to negotiate a security arrangement with Aus-
tralia and New Zealand pursuant to Articles 51 and 52 of the United
Nations Charter. The outcome of these negotiations was the security
treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the U.S. commonly called ANZUS.
Australia had hoped for a security arrangement along the same lines
as NATO, but there is a fundamental difference between NATO and ANZUS.
Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty reads:
"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them
in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them
all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs,
each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective
self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United
Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attached by taking forth-
with, individually and in concert with the other parties, such actions
as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore
and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area..."
This article caused problems for the U.S. administration during the
Senate ratification process. As a result of the NATO ratification
problem, the ANZUS Treaty was reworded to read:
"Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on
any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance
with its constitutional processes."
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It is important to note that the ANZUS Treaty is military in nature
and Great Britain was not incl\ided. Had Great Britain been included in
a Pacific Pact, France and the Netherlands would also have had to be
9included. Since Australia and New Zealand desired a more inclusive
security structure in the Pacific, they stated in the preamble to ANZUS
that they were "to coordinate their efforts for collective defenses for
the preservation of peace and secxirity pending the development of a more
comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area.'
The "more comprehensive system of regional security" seemed to be
out of reach in the early 1950 's. Australian Foreign Minister Casey, in
September 1953, stated that:
"Vie do not know how much a wider system of security will come into
being. For the present, the essential political conditions for such
a system do not appear to exist. I do not find that there is as yet
the community of interest and readiness to assume in advance far-
reaching and precise military obligations on which a treaty of alliance
like NATO is based. "11
In early 1954, the situation in the Far East had changed substantial-
ly."^^ The imminent Communist victory in Indochina generated a joint
communique issued on April 14 by the U.K. and U.S. governments, stating
that they were:
"ready to take part with the other countries principally concerned in
an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defense
within the Charter of the United Nations Organization to assure the
peace, security, and freedom of South-East Asia and the Western
Pacific."!^
Based on statements by Secretary of State Dulles, Australia felt
that the United States was looking for a threat of armed intervention
against the Communists to stop the Communist advance in Indochina. This
posed a dilemma for Australia. On the one hand, were Australia to take
part in an armed intervention in Vietnam, it would lose much of the Asian
goodwill built up since World War II.
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Foreign Minister Casey felt that Vietnam had deteriorated to the
point that outside intervention could not help the French. Mr. Casey's
general view of the Southeast Asia crisis was expressed as follows:
"Talk of intervention - particularly in the air - in order to save
the situation, was being widely canvassed at that time. Our Australian
view was that such intervention would be wrong for the following
reasons: it would not have the backing of the United Nations; it
would put us in the wrong with world opinion, particularly in Asia;
it would probably embroil us with Communist China; it would wreck the
Geneva Conference; and it was most unlikely to stop the fall of Dien
Bien Phu. These were the views that I expressed on behalf of the
Australian Government to Mr. Dulles, Mr. Eden and other leaders at
Geneva. "^^
Before Australia could make a decision on policy for Indochina,
Dien Bien Phu fell to the Vietminh. The issue now became one of achiev-
ing the best possible negotiated settlement in Indochina, carrying inter-
national guaranties. One guaranty was the Southeast Asia Collective
Defense Treaty Organization which became known as SEATO.
SEATO probably was not all that each of the participants wanted in
a defense treaty but it was the best that could be negotiated. Professor
T.B. Millar, one time director of the Australian Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs, stated that the Australian reason for adhering to the
treaty was that "SEATO replaced the French colonial power in containing
the aggressive policies of international communism in Southeast Asia."
The Australians saw SEATO as a complement to ANZUS. The Minister
of Defence, Sir Philip McBride, stated after the Geneva settlement for
Indochina, that Australia now needed a defense strategy against an enemy
"whose nearest springboard was South China but has now become North
Vietnam." Australia must now be prepared "to hold the Communists at the
farthest point advantageous to us, and we must consolidate our strength
as quickly as possible." Again, Professor Millar stated:
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"SEATO thus committed the United States Cso far as constitutional
processes' would allow) to the defence of mainland South-East Asia.
For Australia, it meant an assurance that the United States would hold
the outer ring of defence, and not merely come to Australia's help if
she were attacked. It interposed American force between the Communist
Tide and Malaya. . .Singapore. . .and Indonesia. . .It remedied the defect
of ANZUS by bringing Britain and the United States into joint planning."
In 1950 Percy Spender, Minister for External Affairs, stated what
would become the "domino theory" when he said, "Should the forces of
Communism prevail and Vietnam come under the heel of Communist China,
Malaya is in danger of being outflanked and it, together with Thailand,
Burma, and Indonesia, will become the next direct object of further
18Communist activities."
In order to protect itself from this threat of the "near north",
Australia sought to establish defensive alliances that included Great
Britain and the United States. Through the ANZAM agreement, ANZUS, and
SEATO, Australia developed military alliances that would counter the
threat of aggressive Communism.
B. FORWARD DEFENSE ACTIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Action in support of a forward defense strategy started as early as
1950. Percy Spender, the Minister for External Affairs^said in April
191950 that Malaya was "of vital concern to the security of Australia."
Because of Australia's concern for Malaya (at this time a British posses-
sion) , a bomber squadron to be used in antibandit operations and a trans-
20port squadron were sent to Singapore.
In 1955, Australia was under increasing pressure from Great Britain
to contribute more to its counterinsurgency operation in Malaya. On
April 1, 1955, Prime Minister Menzies announced that Australian troops
would be sent to Malaya to be included in the Commonwealth Strategic
21
Reserves and for possible use under SEATO.
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The forces deployed to Malaya were from all the services. The naval
forces included two destroyers or two fast frigates, an aircraft carrier
on an annual visit, and additional ships in an emergency. The Army sup-
plied an infantry battalion, with reinforcements in Australia. The Air
Force provided a bomber wing of one squadron, an airfield construction
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squadron, and two fighter squadrons earmarked for deployment after 1956.
This deployment was a major departure from previous Australian policy
in that it marked the first time that ground troops had been deployed
in peacetime. Prime Minister Menzies defended the necessity as follows:
"There was a time when we permitted ourselves to think that we were
remote from the dangers of the world, and that any great war would be
thousands of miles away from us. But that day has gone... I call
upon all Australians to realise the basic truth... that if there is to
be war for our existence, it should be carried on by us as far from our
soil as possible."
He went on to say that it would be unbelievable for any responsible
Australian to think that
"we could be effectively defended either by our own efforts within
our own borders or by resolutions of the United Nations rendered impo-
tent by the Communist veto. The simple English of this matter is that
with our vast territory and our small population we cannot survive a
surging Communist challenge from abroad except by the co-operation of
powerful friends, including in particular the United Kingdom and the
United States... we cannot accept the collaboration of our friends and
allies in a comprehensive defence against aggressive Communism unless
we as a nation are prepared to take our share of the responsibilities."
Australia's war time experience had shown that in order to have a larger
voice in security planning it would have to shed its former role of
follower and supporter. Prime Minister Menzies v/as now taking the initia-
tive of making Australia a full-time player in the area security calculus.
The Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia quoted the
Government's Defence Policy announcement of June 4, 1947 as:
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"Our Forces [axe] to be placed at the disposal of the United Nations
for the maintenance of international peace and security, including
regional agreements in the Pacific;
The Forces lare] to be maintained under arrangements for co-operation
in British Commonwealth Defence, and
The Forces are to be maintained to provide for the inherent right
of individual self-defense."
In 1956, when Australia took an active role in regional defense, the
official governmental policy was that defense would be transformed
"from preparedness by a critical date, to the capacity to maintain it
25
at a level that can resonably be sustained for a long haul." The
bottom line of the defense structure in 1955 was still that Australian
forces would continue to act in concert with her "powerful friends."
The defense policy also called for Australia "to be committed as a mem-
ber of the British Commonwealth, and in accordance with the provisions
of the ANZUS Treaty, the .Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty, and
the charter of the United Nations, to co-operate in collective security."
These deployments left Australia short of manpower on the continent.
Professor Millar said that the force deployed to Malaya "v/as as big a
force as Australia could have sent anywhere, and maintained, in 1955.
If, therefore, she wished to satisfy (or appease?) both her 'powerful
friends' with more than a token of force, this was probably the best
^ ^ -.27way to do so.
In 1955, when Australia sent additional troops to Malaya, the area
was still under British rule. In 1957 Malaya achieved independence and
signed an agreement on external defense and mutual assistance with the
U. K. This defense agreement afforded Great Britain the "right to main-




Since Australia was not a signatory^ to the Anglo-Malayan Defense
Agreement, there was some ambiguity as to whether her forces in Malaya
were a part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. Australia became
associated with the treaty provisions relating to reserve through an
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exchange of letters in March and April 1959.
In 1963, Britain attempted to decolonize the Malayan area in an
orderly manner by establishing the Federation of Malaysia. The Federa-
tion included Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo (Sabah) , and Sarawak.
Indonesia and the Philippines protested the Federation as being neo-
imperialistic but the Federation came into existence -on 15 September 1963
after a United Nation's commission found in favor of the incorporation.
To express its displeasure, Indonesia began a period of "Confrontation"
against the Federation.
When Malaysia was formed the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement was
extended to include all of the Federated territories. Australia, as in
1959, exchanged letters with the new Malaysian government to provide
the legal basis for continuing the deployment of Australian forces as
part of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. Professor Millar pointed out
that Australia did not associate herself with the treaty to defend Malay-
sia. Australia only "associated herself by exchange of letters with that
part of the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement which afforded Britain the
right to maintain in the federation a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve with
an unspecified role."
Australia was not a party to the Malaysian confrontation and there-
fore tried to keep its troops out of the conflict. Australia sought to
resolve the problem through negotiation to preserve good relations with
Indonesia. As the situation deteriorated and Indonesia stepped up
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guerrilla attacks against Borneo, Great Britain declared that it would
defend the independence of Malaysia.
This declaration placed Australia in a position it had tried to avoid
through a negotiated settlement. It now had to choose whether or not to
provide military assistance. On 25 September 1963, Prime Minister Menzies
gave Australia's unqualified pledge of military assistance:
"...if, in the circumstances that now exist, and which may continue
for a long time, there occurs, in relation to Malaysia or any of its
constituent States, armed invasion or subversive activity - supported
or directed or inspired from outside Malaysia - we shall to the best
of our powers and by such means as shall be agreed upon with the
Government of Malaysia, add our military assistance to the efforts of
Malaysia and the United Kingdom in the defence of Malaysia's territori-
al integrity and political independence.""^^
After this statement Australia sent additional ships and a squadron
of army engineers. Until October 29, Australian troops were operating
near the Thai border against Communist insurgents. Australian troops
were used for the first time against Indonesian raiders on 29 October.
Australia finally committed infantrymen and paratroopers to the Borneo
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states on 3 February 1965.
In 1965 Indonesia experienced internal political problems and con-
frontation eased until it ended in 1966. Meanwhile, Great Britain was
considering a reduction of its military commitments in Asia because the
cost was becoming prohibitive.
In July 1967, Great Britain announced a timetable of withdrawal
from bases in both Malaysia and Sinapore. In a White Report the govern-
ment noted "We intend to withdraw altogether from our bases in Singapore
34
and Malaysia in the middle 1970' s." In March 1970, in the debate on
the annual Defense VJhite Paper in the House of Commons, Mr. Denis Healy
clearly stated Britain's reasons for withdrawal:
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"...operations even against external subversion and infiltration are
very expensive in troops and very difficult to control... We have a
commitment now in the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement .. .the Agree-
ment in its present form involves an automatic commitment. It gives
to the other signatory of the Agreement a blank cheque to call on British
troops. It is a commitment which applies to Britain alone. It does
not apply to the Australian and New Zealand Governments, and there is
no chance that they would accept a commitment of this type. Therefore
this commitment would provide no basis for the presence of their forces
once we have gone. This is why the Government is seeking release from
the commitment. . .and we are seeking a nev; form of political frame-
work. "^5
In January 1968, the British Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Affairs, George Thomson, visited Australia to tell the Australian
government that the British withdrawal from Southeast Asia would be
accelerated. The Australian government expressed its obvious concern
that security questions are global questions and British withdrawal could
36damage the security system of Southeast Asia.
The basic problem with the British withdrawal was not solely mili-
tary. The British presence had acted as a unifier for the area to
Australia's north and a withdrawal presented the possibility of regional
fragmentation. Australia saw the need for a military credibility in the
area and it had historically not had a military credibility. Peter
Robinson stated at a seminar on British withdrawal that Australian
"Defence policy, at least until very recently, had been based entirely
on the concept of Australian forces as adjuncts to much bigger forces
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provided by powerful allies."
In 1968 the Australian government was being criticized for not pre-
senting Australia's role in the region after British withdrawal. The
public favored a continued presence in the region and, in November 1968,




On 25 February 1969, Prime Minister Gorton announced that Australia
would maintain its military forces in the area to help provide stabili-
ty. He stated that
"...Our own starting point was and is that we are a part of and are
situated in the region. Hence security, stability and progress for
other nations in the region must also contribute to the security of
Australia. We cannot fail to be affected by what happens in our neigh-
bors countries. What affects their security affects our security...
We could not turn our backs on our neighbors, refuse to help provide
forces for their security, and wash our hands of possible consequences
to them and to ourselves. "-^^
This announcement was a major departure from previous policies in that
it marked the first time that Australian forces had been deployed out-
side Australia without accompanying British or American troops.
On October 31, 1971, the Anglo-Malaya Defense Agreement lapsed.
It was replaced on November 1st by the newly negotiated Five Power De-
fense Arrangements. This new arrangement included Great Britain, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore. The Five Power Defense
arrangement was not a treaty but an agreement that
:
"in the event of any form of armed attack externally organized or
supported or the threat of such attack against Malaysia or Singapore,
their Governments would immediately consult together for the purpose
of deciding what measures should be taken jointly or separately in
relation to such attack or threat. "^"^
C. FORWARD DEFENSE ACTIONS IN INDOCHINA
Australia's involvement in Vietnam began in May 1962 when it announced
it would send 30 military advisors to Vietnam. This began "the most con-
troversial aspect of her foreign policy in the post-1945 period, if not in
41her history." Many Australians have justified their military involve-
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ment m terms of its obligations under SEATO.
During March 1962 Vietnam twice approached Australia concerning mili-
tary assistance. The first was the Republic of Vietnam's Assistant
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Defense Minister asking the Australian Ambassador in Saigon if Australian
instructors in Malaya could instruct Vietnamese Ctraining would be in
Malayal . The second was a letter from President Diem to Prime Minister
Menzies stating the Republic of Vietnam's case against Communism and how
his government needed assistance from the Free World. -^ In neither case,
however, was military assistance directly requested.
At the Z\NZUS council meeting on 9 May 1952 Prime Minister Menzies
told Admiral H.D. Felt, CINCPAC, "that Australia was willing to supply
instructors. . .provided that a request was received from the Republic of
44Vietnam." On 24 May 1962 Australia announced that military instructors
were being provided "at the invitation of the Government of the Republic
of Vietnam. ""^^
On 2 April 1963, the United States sent a request for a Dakota squad-
ron and 16 pilots. The formal refusal to honor the request was given as
the replacement of the Dakota's with the Caribou. The probable real
reason was that it would have necessitated a change from a non-combatant
to a combatant role and the government was not prepared to explain this
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to the Australian pxiblic.
At the 1964 Council meeting, the SEATO members decided that they
should be prepared to support the Republic of Vietnam if it became
necessary. On 6 May 1964 the American Embassy in Canberra notified the
Department of External Affairs that President Johnson thought more free
world countries should "show their flags" in South Vietnam. A few days
later the United States Embassy in Canberra delivered a more detailed
list of items specifically requested from Australia."
The American request was favorably considered because it was felt
that "South Vietnam was a key strategic area and that if it fell the
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West would be unlikely to hold Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, tliis would
in turn make the future of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines very
uncertain. . .it would Calso) influence the obligation which the United
States might feel to Australia in an emergency."
In January 1965 Australian military authorities concluded that the
prospects of a victory in Vietnam had become remote "without strong and
stcible leadership or without the introduction of a new factor such as
49
counter action by the United States or other nations." As a result
of this feeling, instructions were sent to Washington that Australia
"would give full public and diplomatic support if the United States
were to initiate air strikes against North Vietnam's infiltration sys-
tem." The Australian Minister for Defense, while visiting Washington
in February, asked McGeorge Bundy the possibility of a SEATO operation
in Vietnam. Bundy pointed out that for "SEATO to operate, South Vietnam
would have to appeal for help and he do\ibted that this was wise for
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fear of refusal by some members."
In the House of Representatives on 29 April 1965, Prime Minister
Menzies announced that Australia would contribute an infantry battalion
to Vietnam. In making this commitment Sir Robert Menzies stated that:
"We have decided - and this has been after close consultation with the
Government of the United States - to provide an infantry battalion for
service in South Vietnam. In case there is any misunderstanding, I
think I should say that we decided in principle sometime ago - weeks
and weeks ago - that we would be willing to do this if we received the
necessary collaboration with the United States. "^^
The decision by the government was condemned by the leader of the opposi-
tion, Mr. Arthur Calwell, when he stated that "by sending one quarter of
our pitifully small effective military strength to distant Vietnam, this
Government dangerously denudes Australia and its immediate strategic
53
environs of effective defence power."
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Since the Prime Minister stated that Australian troops would be sent
"if we received the necessary rec[uest from the Government of South Viet-
nam", the request requires consideration. On 9 April 1965, the Australi-
an government acceded to an informal request from the United States for
an infantry battalion. On 13 April the Australian Ambassador in Washing-
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ton made the offer to the Secretary of State.
The Australian Ambassador in Saigon wanted to make the offer of troops
to Dr. Quat, the Premier of the Republic of Vietnam, with General Taylor,
the American Ambassador in Saigon. On 24 April the offer was presented
to Dr. Quat by General Taylor. The Australian Ambassador did not see
Dr. Quat until 28 April. On 29 April the Australian Ambassador reported
that Dr. Quat had agreed verbally to the Australian offer.
Also on 29 April, a letter was dispatched confirming Australia's
offer and Vietnam's acceptance. It was on the basis of this dispatch
that Prime Minister Menzies made his announcement. Evidence supports
the notion that the Vietnamese request honored by Australia was actually
arranged by the United States and Australia.
As the war in Vietnam became larger, Australia increased troop levels
in August 1965, March 1966, December 1966, and October 1967. These in-
creases were logical extensions of the 29 April 1965 decision which was
made as a projection of the forward defense policy. This policy was based
on the necessity of committing the power of the United States to the Asian
area. Since Australia considered the Asian area as a "key strategic
area" for its security, it had to depend on the United States for any
success against the spread of Communism in this politically unstable area.
Australia was therefore prepared "to ensure that the United States did
not waver in its commitment to South East Asia and to support the American
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presence politically, diplomatically and if necessary militarily."
D. THE FORITARD DEFENSE DEBATE
There are several points of view on the issue of forward defense.
Probably the most important, since it is the one norroally used in justi-
fying the forward defense, is the alliance-based argument. Australia
has always portrayed itself as a small-to-middle power in an unstable
area and therefore needed to associate itself with "great and powerful
friends." An alliance would require an Australian contribution to allied
security efforts in order to keep its "great friends" committed to the
area. Without "great friend" help, no Australian effort would be suffi-
cient to meet a threat. This argument obviously presupposes a perceived
threat, for without a threat there is no need for an alliance.
Bruce Grant, foreign affairs editor of The Age , advanced the view
that "The value of ANZUS is in many ways dependent on American forces
themselves being interposed between Australia and the aggressor, so that
57the Amerxcan forces themselves receive the first thrust of the attack."
This is a way of saying that Australia, by keeping the United States in-
volved in the area, assured itself not only that any threat would be
met but also that it best assured its own ultimate defense.
The strategy has often been criticized because the "great friend"
is more apt to become involved in an action that Australia would prefer
to avoid but is coerced into supporting in order to "pay its dues" for
the alliance. It is also argued that the alliance would necessarily
involve them "in a number of dangers, e.g. being a nuclear hostage or
being attacked in a course of a general war in which we have taken sides. "^°
A second argument for forward defense would be the threat-based
argiiment. Australia has historically worried over real or perceived /^
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threats because they were a white, Western culture in an Asian area.
Indeed, this was the main reason for ANZUS, ANZAM, and SEATO. External
Affairs Minister R.G. Casey, after a trip through Southeast Asia in
1951, spoke of what was to become known as the "domino theory":
"The third main conclusion which I reached is that of the great impor-
tance of Indo-China and Burma to the security of Malaya - indeed of
South East Asia as a whole. I believe that the realisation of this
particular point was probably the most important single result of my
trip. If Indo-China and Burma were lost to the Communists - indeed,
if either of them were lost — Thailand would be immediately out-flanked,
and it would be difficult, if not impossible, for Thailand successfully
to resist heavy Communist pressure unless very substantial help v/ere
afforded her from without... It seems to me only logical that Australia
must pay greater attention to developments in areas to the north of
Malaya on which the security of Malaya may well substantially depend."-"^
Fear of what Communist expansion might do to Australian security
prompted successive governments to support the opposition to this move-
ment in Malaysia and Vietnam.
In the late 1960 's the strategic environment began to change and this
brought more criticism of the forward-defense strategy. Advocates of
armed neutrality, like Dr. Max Teichman, argued that;
"There are no substantial military threats to Australia now, nor will
there be for many years to come. Insistence that we are threatened
is rooted in our cultural history, i.e. is part of the Australian way
of life, rather than a conclusion drawn from an examination of the
capacities, intentions and foreign policy priorities of our neighbors. m60
By 1959, Great Britain had announced its withdrawal from East of
Suez, the Malayan-Indonesian confrontation had ended, and the United
States had announced the Guam Doctrine. Fighting was still going on in
Vietnam, but it was doubted that Vietnam would have a major effect on
Malaysia and Indonesia. In February 1969, Mr. Gough Whitlam said that
"in practical terms 'forward defense' was merely a euphemmism for a
policy aimed at keeping powerful allies, namely the United States
and Britain, militarily involved on the mainland of Asia. The reality
of the decade about to begin is that these powers, for a whole variety
of reasons—economic, political and military—are no longer willing
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to accept that involvement. Therefore, the whole premise on which the
forward defence fraud was based has crashed. "°-'-
By 1970, Australia's attention was drawn to its immediate area of
strategic interest - the near north and the surrounding Indian and Pacific
waters. It saw the United States calling "on the countries of the region
to do more themselves to provide for their own security," and the Soviet
Union giving "notice of its expanding maritime power and its interest in
exerting influence upon many countries surrounding the Indian Ocean."
Australia saw Japan, as the third industrial nation in the world, also
playing a major role within the region.
Australian defense was no longer underwritten by Great Britain or the ^^
United States. Australia now needed to help insure her security through
regional co-operation. The posture of regional military co-operation was
set forth by Defense Minister Malcolm Fraser:
"Australia's defence planning and preparations flow from a decision for
continuing close involvement in South East Asian affairs notwithstanding
the changing strategic circumstances and future uncertainties. They
rest on the premise that as events unfold in the region to which our
security is permanently linked, we must ourselves be able to influence
the course they are taking more independently, less as a supporter of
the commitments of major powers and more as a partner with other region-
al countries. "^-^
As the 1970 's began, Australia's "great and powerful friends" had sig-
nalled an end to the "containment" period and Australia was faced with
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IV. THE SEARCH FOR A SELF-RELIANT DEFENSE
A. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES
The early 1970 's introduced a new posture in Australian defense.
In order to build a more self-reliant defense force, serious funda-
mental questions concerning the objectives to guide Australian policies
' in the strategic field and the structure of the defense forces to realize
these objectives had to be determined.
The government began dealing with these questions in 1970 by making
policy changes toward achieving a policy "of broad ranging participation
and co-operation in regional affairs." The defense forces, therefore,
had to be not only organized, trained, and equipped for the defense of
the continent but also ready for "effective employment in the region of
2
which Australia is a part." To facilitate this, some major defense
administration changes were made.
The intelligence organization had to provide the best political,
strategic, and tactical information available so the intelligence organ-
ization was one of the first to be radically changed. In 1970 the Joint
Intelligence Organization CJIO) came into existence. It was only an
analysis and information agency and did not collect intelligence. It
I
was "to provide expert technical analysis and the best kind of judgment
on kinds of security problems that might arise."
The JIO brought sections of the Service Intelligence Directorates
and the former Joint Intelligence Bureau of the Defense Department
together with External Affairs participation. Its first director was
a senior member of the Department of External Affairs. This ensured
58

that political aspects were not neglected even though the JIO charter
detailed its function of intelligence assessments "on military, economic,
4
scientific, and technical matters affecting Australia's defence."
Superimposed on the JIO was the National Intelligence Committee
CNIC) , whose membership comprised the three heads of the civil and mili-
tary elements of the JIO with the chairman being the director of the
JIO. These intelligence organizations contributed materially to the
decisions about the size and shape of Australia's forces and the weapon-
ry that would be required.
One big reason for restructuring the intelligence organization was
a change in the procedure for long range planning. Australian defense
planning had been based on Three Year Defense Programs until 1970. Then,
the government introduced the Five Year Rolling Program, and Defense
Minister Malcolm Fraser pointed out weaknesses in the Three Year Defense
Program:
"First, the process was one of stops and starts with the forward look
shrinking from three years at the outset to zero at the end of the
period. Second, the financial implications of the new proposals were
not projected sufficiently far into the future to allow the decision-
makers to properly weigh their choices. Third, related components of
a proposal were not always brought together into a single coherent
submission.
.
.Fourth, the proposals, when submitted to Defence, tended
to be firmly set and to specify a particular equipment. There was
little or no opportunity for Defence to conduct, well in advance, sys-
tematic study of the economic and other implications of proposals before
a specific solution had been selected."^
The Five Year Rolling Program was aimed at identification of the
major objectives of the defense forces and assignment of associated
costs for these objectives over a period long enough to measure full
resource needs. It was, basically, the planning-prograraming-budgeting
systems approach to management. The sequence and relationship of the
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strategic guidance was the starting point, where the JIO and NIC inter-
faced with the process. Their information provided the basis for the
formulation of the force structure.
The projection of existing commitments required the services to
project expenditures for the next five years assuming that no new major
equipment would be purchased and commitments would not change.
The preparation of major new proposals required the services to
project which capabilities would need replacing in the five year period
and what new equipment should be purchased.
Analysis of new proposals was done by the Department of Defence.
It analyzed both the cost and effectiveness of proposed equipment. The
only equipment requiring final decisions were those to be purchased in
year one.
Once' the Five Year Plan has been formulated, it is viewed against
the strategic guidance overlay to determine if alternative plans need to
be made, based on changes in the strategic environment.
The basic plan and its variations are then screened by the services,
which change any details which have changed as a result of changes in
price or delivery schedules. While the services make last minute cor-
rections of details, the Department of Defence prepares it for submission
to the cabinet. After the cabinet decides on the plan, the whole process
moves forward one year and the cycle begins anew.
To parallel the changes going on in the defense community, the De-
fence Ministry called for a general review of Australian defense. Its
purpose was "to inform the public generally of the nature and extent
of Australia's defence capabilities, of the foreseeable or contingent
roles of our forces, of the environments in which these must be envisaged




















































































The defense review pointed out that Australia had historically been
protected by its geographical remoteness but that this very protection
was now a vulnerability. Maritime power was now more v/idely shared
and long range missile technology and undetected movement by sea had
developed substantially.
Australia's economic strength comes from its commerce with trading
partners in the archipelagoes to the North, and East and West across
I
the Pacific and Indian Oceans. These long communication lines could now
t
be fairly easily blocked (see Figure 2}
.
Australia saw the continental shelf with its valuable fishing areas
and resource rich sea-beds as an area for protection and future negotia-
tion (see Figure 3) . Australia had already reached agreement with Indo-
nesia in delineating sea-bed boundaries in a substantial part of the
Arafura Sea. As modern technology made the shelf's resources more
accessible, more competition for these resources would result. This
competition had the potential for creating tension among the principal
competitors.
Australia's strategic interests were closely related to the oceans
and the Southeast Asian archipelagoes. It was correctly analyzed that
"By no stretch of the imagination could Australia assume in the fore-
seeable future a capability to control. . .the vast areas of the ocean
which give access to the coasts of our continent and our dependencies -
g
though in selected areas we need to be able to do this." The Defence
Department thought that Australian maritime interests would be best
I served by denying to others the measure of control they would need in

















l^ASFD ON 20n- METRE DEPTH LIME
Source: Australian Defence Review, p. 7.
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The Defence Review saw the objective of a defense policy as one
involving more than Australian territory alone. Some Australian defense
interests, such as great poiver equilibrium in the adjoining oceans, could
not be guaranteed by its own efforts. Its role in this interest was
viewed as being capable of giving military support to the United States
9
which, by extension, projected U.S. military strength beyond its shores.
Other Australian defense interests were closer to home and more easily
influenced. These included:
"the security of our neighbors in South East Asia and the South
West Pacific;
the security of our peacetime and wartime lines of communication
through these areas;
the security of our offshore resources;
the security of the ocean areas generally from which direct threats
to the security of Australia could be brought to bear in the longer
term. "10
When it Ipst the 1972 general election, the government had taken pains
to assess Australia's strategic calculus and reorganize portions of the
Department of Defence in order to build a more self-reliant defense
policy and force. For the first time in 23 years, the Liberal-Country
party was the opposition and not the government.
B. DEFENCE UNDER LABOR
In December 1972 E. Gough Whitlam became the first Australian Labor
Party (ALP) Prime Minister since 1949. He set the tone for his govern-
ment shortly after he was sworn in when he stated:
"the general direction of my thinking is towards a more independent
Australian stance in international affairs and towards an Australia
which will be less militarily oriented and not open to suggestion of
racism; an Australia which will enjoy a growing standing as a distinc-
tive, tolerant, co-operative and well regarded nation not only in the
Asian and Pacific region but in the world at large." *
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1. Relationships With Other Nations
Since the Australian-American relationship began, Labor had
always been somewhat skeptical of the manner in which the Liberal
government had nourished the link between the two nations. Labor had
expressed reservations about both ANZUS and SEATO and was extremely
outspoken on Vietnam and U.S. installations in Australia. The "more
independent Australian stance in international affairs" was therefore
a cue meaning more independent of the United States in particular.
Labor felt that the Liberal governments had allowed defense
considerations to dictate foreign policy. As Labor had a general aver-
sion for military solutions to international problems, they renounced
the "forward defense" policy and set a course for their concept of self-
reliancy. The ALP did not intend to ignore defense, and called for the
defense to be "so effective as to demonstrate beyond all doubt Australia's
12intention to defend itself and her vital interests."
Since the inception of United States facilities in Australia,
the left wing of the ALP claimed that they violated Australia's sovereign-
ty and made Australia a nuclear target. The ALP left wing argued that
facilities such as the U.S. Naval Communication Station "Harold E. Holt"
at North West Cape might unnecessarily draw Australia into Soviet tar-
geting, since U.S. submarines would receive strike orders through this
facility. The installation was commissioned in 1967 and is one of the
13
most important links in the United States communications network. To
counter the pressure from the left. Defense Minister Lance Barnard visited




I'ir. Barnard met with the U.S. Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger and expressed to him the Australian government ' s concern
"that the continued operation of the station be consistent with the
national [Australian] interest and that Australia participate in its
14
operation and management." The ministers agreed that "Australian
servicemen would participate in the management and operation of the
station" and that the Australians would be placed in key positions and
establish a substantial Australian contribution to the management and
operation of the station."-'-^ Even though the 1974 agreement was more
congruent with Australian interests, it failed to satisfy the left wing
of the ALP. Senator Gietzelt stated the left wing position when he said
"It is very important that part of Australian sovereignty has been won
back. But I am one of those who would like to see all foreign bases
out of Australia."
Two other United States' facilities that created considerable
consternation in Australian nationalist ranks were Pine Gap and Nurrunga.
These sites are ground stations for American satellites. Pine Gap is ^^
a highly sensitive site operated by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
with National Security Agency participation. It monitors Soviet and
17Chinese military communications and radar transmissions.
Nurrunga is a portion of the American satellite early warning
system. It provides a "real-time data link betiveen North American Air
Defence Command (NORAD) , the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and the National
18Military Command System." The agreements covering these installations
ran until 1976 and 1978 respectively. In each case a year's formal
notice could be given for termination. Though the Labor government was
not in favor of these installations, Mr. I'^itlam stated in April 1974
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that the existing agreements would be continued but would not be extended
upon expiration. These concessions do not satisfy those who have
opposed the American installations and they indicate that the ALP will
assume as large a role as possible in their operation without placing
a significant strain on the Australian - United States relationship.
Significant changes were also made in relationships with other
nations when Labor came into power. The last Liberal-Country Party
government had withdrawn all Australian combat troops from Vietnam before
the 1972 election. Upon coming to office, Labor immediately withdrew
all remaining Australian troops and terminated the defense aid programs
20
to South Vietnam and Cambodia.
The new government had its own views of the Five Power Arrange-
ment, and these were implemented shortly after coming to office. Labor
decided that Australian forces v/ere not needed in Singapore. It announced
that the 6th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment and the 106 Field
Battery would return to Australia by February 1974. Australian forces
would then be further reduced to about 150 personnel, the number required
21to implement the government's technical assistance and aid programs.
Papua New Guinea (PNG) also received attention from the new
government. PNG was under Australian trusteeship in accordance with the
United Nations Charter, but that trusteeship presented the government
with the possibility of having to deploy Australian military forces to
meet a threat. For this reason. Labor developed a policy of moving PNG
to independence as rapidly as possible. In 1972 and 1973, the PNG
leadership was increasingly involved in aspects of its own defense. In
January 1973 the PNG Joint Force was redesignated the PNG Defence Force,
shovrLng the step toward an independent defense structure. ^^
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In March 1975, Australia transferred the defense power to Papua
New Guinea in advance of its independence, which came that November.
Australia retained the responsibility for PNG defense but PNG had control
of its own military forces. Mr. Robert O'Neill, head of the Strategic
and Defence Studies Centre, suggests that Labor was afraid that a region-
al disturbance within PNG would require the Australian government to act
to sustain the authority of the new PNG government. By transferring the
defense power to the new government, PNG ability to control internal
23
challenges would be strengthened.
Accompanying the shrinkage of Australian overseas commitments
was a re-examination of Australian defense policies. Its findings were:
"that there was a very strong trend away from the prospect of renewed
global conflict. The ability of the two super powers to destroy each
other by nuclear exchange placed substantial restraint on direct
military confrontation and had moved those two powers towards detente
and co-operation in handling situations that could lead to critical
confrontation. . .that present trends generally pointed to a prospect
of relative stability in global order .. .Fighting continued in Indo-
china, but it was for the peoples of that region themselves to reach
the political settlements necessary to bring an end to this.'
This perception of low threat allowed Australia to assume a new approach
to defense. Forward defense had given way to continental defense, as
the former was unappealing because of the feared effect on Australia's
relations with Asian states and the implication of Australian colonialism.
2. Defense Structure and Expenditure
In the campaign for the 1972 election, Labor committed itself
to abolishing the National Service Act (conscription) , a major defense
reorganization, and a defense expenditure of 3.5% of the Gross National
Product (GNP) . On coming to office, Labor immediately terminated the
National Service Act. Once the act was abolished, the nxrmber of personnel
in the defense forces decreased dramatically. Labor came to office
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with about 80,900 troops in the Permanent Defense Forces of which about
12,000 were conscripts. The following year, 1973, Australia had a
Permanent Defense Force of about 73,900 of whom 2800 were conscripts.
The defense forces bottomed in 1974 with a force of 67,500, with 38
conscripts. In 1975 the defense force strength increased to 69,000,
25but this fell short of the 73,000 estimate of the government.
Labor had made good its promise to abolish conscription but
defense was left with manpower problems. The R.A.N, and the R.A.A.F.
were not affected because most conscripts served in the army. The
Liberal-Country Party argued that the array should be kept at a strength
of about 40,000 but Labor saw a need for the army's strength to be only
34,000.2^ The army's strength stabilized at about 31,500 with the
operational units being reorganized into six understrength battalions.
The reorganization of army operational units was by no means the extent
of Labor reorganization.
On December 1972, Minister for Defence Barnard announced that a
reorganization of the Defence Group of Departments would take place in
stages. The first stage, beginning that day, would be the Department
of Defence assuming a "greater authority in its direction of the execu-
tion of defence policy and approved defence objectives by each of the
three Service Boards.' The second stage, which was to begin before
the end of 1973, would be "to merge into the Department of Defence the
three Service Departments, and to reorganize the place in the defence
system of the procurement and production activities and the Australian
Defence Scientific Service now in Supply. "^°
The proposed clianges were criticized in that they dealt with
higher policy making bodies within the Department of Defence and the
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civilian - military balance within its groups. They were also criti-
cized for taking power from the military and transferring it to public
civil servants. The most important criticism was that the reorgani-
zation did not address the issue of assigning specific tasks to the
services as a part of an integrated and co-ordinated national defense
strategy. Mr. Robert O'Neill stated that:
"Australian policy is still to await an emergency and then to shape
a force to meet it, thereby heightening the importance of warning
times and the tensions which would follow any decision to commence
shaping a special force. "^^
Labor instigated a most important reorganization of the Citizen
Military Forces (Reserves) . The investigation into what should be done
with the CMF was chaired by Dr. T.B. Millar of the Australian National
University. The Millar Committee saw the necessity of retaining the
CMF but found that many units were below the strength necessary for
effective functioning.
The CMF was to be renamed the A2rmy Reserve and would include
trained and partially trained personnel who, in time of war or defense
emergency, could be readily engaged for military employment. The impor-
tance of the role of the CMF can be seen in the stated defense policy
that "the basic concept for the force structure is a core force in being
of sufficient skills and capabilities to allow timely expansion should
there be unfavorable developments in the strategic situation."
The Liberal-Country Party government in its last year in office
spent 3.3 percent, of the GNP on defense. In 1972-1973, defense expendi-
ture fell to 3.1 percent, and Labor in its first full year in office
reduced defense spending to 2.8 percent of GNP. In dollar terras, defense
expenditures rose under Labor. In 1973-1974, it was up $127 million
from the year before, which amounted to a 10.4 percent increase but this
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was still only 2.8 percent of GNP. The years 1974-1975 showed a further
$384 million increase for a 27.3 percent increase in defense expendittire
32
but again a large increase was only 3.0 percent of GNP. These in-
creases should also be viewed from the perspective that Australias'
inflation rate was about 17 percent at this time.
Defense spending can be also very misleading when trying to
relate the amount of money spent with military capabilities. Because of
the rapid reduction of manpov/er after Labor came to office, service pay
and amenities were increased rapidly and generously. Thus, manpower
costs increased from 52.1 percent of total defense expenditure for
1972-1973 to 60.7 percent for 1973-1974. For the same periods outlays
for new capital equipment for the armed services went from 10.9 percent
to 6.5 percent of total defense expenditures. New capital equipment was
33
even further reduced to 4.8 percent during 1974-1975.
Some of the decline in defense spending can be attributed to the
reduction and later withdrawal of Australian participation in Indochina
and Singapore. The continued decline in capital equipment is not consis-
tent, however, when viewed in the context of achieving a more independent
military force. The government, in its effort to make defense salaries
competitive with the private sector, failed to achieve a balance between
the number of servicemen and the quality and quantity of material for
their use.
The equipment prociorement policy in particular was attacked by
the L-CP. Mr. Killen, the L-CP showdow Defence Minister maintained that
"Australia's defence equipment situation was not critical, not grave,
34
It was 'plainly desperate.'" The government attempted to pursue a
policy of local production as well as purchasing from overseas.
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Australia was forced to purchase modern technological equipment
from overseas because it lacked the production capability. Labor wanted
to take advantage of the current situation of "no apparent threats" to
"look critically at the industrial sector of our economy and to aim
selectively at strengthening and developing those areas which are seen
35
as vital to our future defence capability."
Labor's policy of simultaneously enhancing Australia's military
production capability and cutting back on defense expenditures for new
capital equipment contains basic contradictions. In order to put the
money into increased local production, Australia had to increase capital
equipment expenditures. Dr. O'Neill, summarized the problem;
"If no major assistance is given to Australia's defence industries,
in the near future, particularly by way of ordering new equipment,
then one of the essential means for reducing Australia's defence
dependence upon great powers will atrophy."
Labor was in office for three years and made major changes in
Australian defense. During its tenure the "no threat" issue dominated
the strategic debate and directed the public away from the issue of a
coherent strategic doctrine that would have given the necessary guidance
for developing and equipping a defense force.
Mr. Whitlam's policy of "a more independent Australian stance
in international affairs" that would dictate defense policy was partially
successful. Australia developed a more independent stance in international
relations that even carried into future L-CP governments. Labor's defense
policies were not nearly as successful. It failed to design a clearly
defined defense policy. Defense was left with organizational changes
still projected, inanpovrer problems in attaining a balance between military
and civilian manning, and serious equipment problems, in that it was pur-
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V. THE STRATEGIC DEBATE
In 1976 Australian defense became an item of grave concern in defense
and academic circles. The Australian National University and the Univer-
sity of Western Australia sponsored conferences on Australian defence
and the government published a White Report, the second in two decades.
The increased dialogues on the issue showed a growing concern about
guidelines to direct defense policy and the defense force structure.
An overriding problem of Australian defense has been that "Despite
the major changes in Australia's circumstances in the last thirty years,
she has been free from threat of military attack since the end of
World War II.' Its recent history, coupled with the present estimate
that "Strategic pressure or direct military threat against Australia,
its territories, maritime resources zone, or lines of communication are
2
at present not estimated as probable,'' has left Australia to develop a
defense policy that must respond to a number of uncertainties that may
resolve themselves unfavorably for Australia. This peaceful period,
however, affords Australia a valuable opportunity to re-think the funda-
mental concepts which will guide its military forces in support of
national objectives.
A. MORE ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES FOR BETTER DECISION-MAKING
Legislation passed by the Commonwealth Parliament in September 1975,
which came into effect on 9 February 1976, created a Chief of the Defence
Force Staff CCDFS) . Until then, the command of Australia's defense was
distributed between the three Service Boards, the Chiefs of Staff
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individually and the Chiefs of Staff Coinmittee corporately. The Chair-
man of the Chiefs of Staff Committee exercised no power of command by
virtue of his position. The CDFS heads a single organization dedicated
to Australian defense. -The Services are now being developed, trained, and
commanded as one national Defence Force.
Under the Defence Re-organization Act, the Minister for Defence is
charged with the administration of the Defence Force. The CDFS commands
the Defence Force and is the principal military advisor to the Minister.
The CDFS and the three Chiefs of Staff make up the Chiefs of Staff
Committee which becomes the center of military planning and collective
professional advice for the Minister. The three Service Boards were
abolished and their powers have been redistributed to the Minister, the
CDFS, the Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defence.
The Secretary of Defence is the principal civilian advisor to the
Minister, and is currently Sir Arthur Tange who has held the position
since its creation in 1970. The Secretary is responsible for the admini-
stration and control of expenditure. (See Figure 4) . The top structure
of the defense organization is a diarchy with the CDFS controlling the
military and working in tandem with the Secretary who controls the
civilian defense employees.
The Secretary, the CDFS, and the Chiefs of Staff are members of the
three principal committees directing policy and administration. They are:
1) The Defence Committee, which includes the Secretaries of the Depart-
ments of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Treasury and Foreign Affairs
Cwith others invited as necessary} , is the most senior decision-making
committee. Its function is to advise the Minister for Defence on
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"the defence policy as a whole; the co-ordination of military, stra-
tegic, economic, financial and external affairs aspects of the defence
policy; matters of policy or principle and important questions having
a joint Service or inter-departmental defence aspect; and such other
matters having a defence aspect as are referred to the Committee by or
on the behalf of the Minister."-^
2) The Defence Force Development Committee (DFDC) is among the pre-eminent
committees in Australian defense decision-making. Its function is
"to advise the Minister for Defence, in the context of strategic
assessments and the most efficient use of resources, on the develop-
ment of the Defence Force as a whole; and the inclusion in the Five
Year Rolling Programme of major weapons and equipment capabilities."
3) The Defence (Administration) Committee, which had been in decline,
has been replaced in importance by the DFDC and deals with the Defence
Budget within the financial dimensions and structure of the FYDP.
General A.L. MacDonald, the second CDFS , stated that the effective-
ness of the Defence Force was enhanced through these improvements to the
infrastructure. He claims that "the methods by which decisions are
reached.
.
.have been refined in recent years" and the new force which
is developing possesses "a greater degree of flexibility and adapta-
bility than ever before and that difficult choices are based on the
best information available." Some people have begun to question the
"best information available" or the strategic guidance necessary for
effective decision-making.
Dr. Desmond Ball of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at
the Australian National University sees five inadequacies in the quality
7
of strategic guidance:
1) The Strategic Basis , the principal relevant document, is too vague,




2) The Strategic Basis has in recent years been published every two years
and is valid for too short a period to base complex force structure and
equipment purchase decisions.
3) The Strategic Basis ' are too narrow in scope and do not deal effec-
tively with contingencies outside low levels of threat.
4) Strategic guidance does not deal with fundamental questions of an
optimal defense posture.
5) Strategic guidance has become too political. The 1975 strategic
assessment had been completed and was awaiting governmental approval
when the government was thrown out of office by the governor-general.
Upon returning to power, the L-CP called for a total rewrite.
When considering the "best information available" there is an addi-
tional factor in the equation. Australia receives much of its intelli-
gence from the United States. The U.S. can therefore influence Australian
defense policy-making through the quality and variety of information
provided Australia. The flow of American intelligence creates even
further problems because of security classifications. Much of the in-
telligence that comes to Australia is covered by extremely tight security
agreements. Even though a great deal of the information finds it way
into the public record in the United States, it is still cloaked in
secrecy in Australia. Because of this secrecy within the Defence Depart-
ment decision-making apparatus, there is no large informed public in
Australia on the subject of defense policy.
B. THE NEW DEFENCE FORCE
Australia's defense infrastructure had always supported the policy
that each of Australia's services would support its sister service
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of the major ally. The Defence Re-Organization Act now joined the Array,
RAN, and RAAF into an integrated force. Acknovrledging the need for a
consolidation. General MacDonald, the CDFS , stated that "Unity of Command
one force, one commander" if you like - is acknowledged as basic to the
successful conduct of military operations and its validity continues
to be demonstrated throughout the Services at all levels and in all
g
matters." With the implementation of the Defence Re-Organization Act,
Australia's future military operations would be conducted as joint oper-
ations of the three services and not as in the past. To do this, Aus-
tralia had to re-evaluate its basic defense capabilities.
1. Threats To Australian Security
Australia has no foreseeable threat in the near future and this
fact compounds the existing problems of the defense planners. Admiral
A.M. Synnot, the recently appointed CDFS, maintains that "At a time of
low or indeterminate threat, strategic guidance cannot be expected to
be sufficiently specific to enable us to determine the force structure;
if there were a clear threat this problem would of course be much easi-
9
er." Australia does, however, face threats.
Basically, Australia has three types of threats:
1) threats to Australian sovereignty such as infringements of her terri-
torial waters in the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ)
,
2) a threat to its continental integrity, such as a landing of small
forces in the north, or 3) a threat to its survival, such as cutting
the sea lines of communication or major invasion.
The third type of threat would be considered a threat to Aus-
tralia's fundamental security. The Australian government has confidence
that "in the event of a fundamental threat to Australia's security, U.S.
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military support would be forthcoming." The highly secret document
entitled "The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, 1975"
calculated that "The United States could not afford to fail to support
Australia in the event of major assault ;/ithout seriously undermining
its strategic position in the Pacific and Indian Oceans."
The first type of threat is one that can be planned for as it
occurs constantly. Foreign fishermen are fishing in Australian waters,
particularly now with the 200NM EEZ. Smuggling would also fall into
this category. This type of threat is an extremely low-level threat,
but it points out the ease with which a threat of type two could be
mounted
.
The second type of threat is the most serious. The area north
of a line running west from Brisbane is sparsely populated and the inter-
nal transportation systems are poor. With little or no warning, a group
of 500 to 1,000 insurgents could lodge themselves in north or northwest
Australia. This area is the most likely to be invaded because of its
sparse population and its closeness to the Indonesian archepelago. For
a group to stage an invasion in areas other than the north would require
near-superpower blue-water capabilities.
Because of the numerous possibilities of infringement on Austra-
lian sovereignty and security included in the first and second types of
threat, Australia has evolved a defense philosophy termed the "core-force."
Admiral Synnot maintains that
"This core force is one which must be able to understand peacetime
tasks; a force sufficiently versatile to deal with a range of the more
credible low-level contingencies; a force with the necessary core of
equipment, at a technological and numerical level, with which we can
train and develop the military skills necessary as a basis for expan-
sion which may be required to deter or meet a developing situation."
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2. The Core Force
The core force concept for security may appear proper because
of Australia's small population. This would allow the permanent forces
to act as a reservoir of defense capabilities while Australia's atten-
tion is directed more toward matters of economic growth, but this philos-
ophy suffers from conceptual problems.
Since the Labor government of 1972-1975 ended conscription, any
military expansion of manpower must have popular support. If the public
felt that a government assessment calling for a buildup in forces was
not accurate, the government would not have available manpower without
changing the laws. Even if manpower were readily available, there would
be a lag between mobilization and combat readiness.
Dr. Ross Babbage of the Australian National University stated
that "between 2\ - 5 years active preparation time would be required
in order to expand the present 32,000 man regular army with its 20,000
' man poorly trained reserve to a well trained 150,000 manned array."
11
This mobilization would begin only when the government had perceived a
specific threat and ordered a mobilization in response. Dr. Babbage
found in his research that in only one instance was defense preparation
14time for conflict in excess of sixteen months.
The expansion philosophy requires a very precise and timely
threat assessment. This a difficult proposition even for a superpower
\ with a large intelligence collection and analysis complex, as evidenced
in the United States' perception of Iran. Even if Australia's intelli-
gence were precise and timely and it could begin an early mobilization
to meet the perceived threat at some future date. Dr. Babbage argues
that "such an early mobilization could well act as a serious destabiliz-
ing influence in a delicate diplomatic situation."-'-^
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In terms of threat, the core force concept seems to be a paradox.
Dr. Ball calls the concept "one of the most reactive planning mechanisms
imaginable." He goes on to say:
"It depends for its efficiency on superior knowledge of threats and
threat lead-times. Yet it is precisely because of the current method-
I,
ological inability to deal with the perceived threat environment that
the concept has prevailed within the Australian defence establishment."
Another aspect of the core force is its equipment, to be main-
tained "at a technological and numerical level, with which we can train
17
and develop the military skills necessary as a basis for expansion."
The apparent equipment purchasing policy of the government is another
area for concern when viev/ed in terms of a core-force.
Many have criticized the government for having an "equipment
syndrome" whereby defense worth is assessed on the amount and condition
of defense equipment. The desire to have state-of-the-art equipment
'! is often rationalized by the necessity of technological superiority of
i the countries that could be potential threats to Australia.
Sometimes the perceived need for state-of-the-art equipment is
actually an unnecessary expenditure of valuable resources. Australia
recently bought 104 German made Leopard tanks to replace the aging
Centurions. This tank is immobile in a large part of the tropical
North and Northeast area. Furthermore, Australia has no capability to
transport the weapon from theater to theater.
In 1978-79, Australia took delivery on 12 C-130H aircraft
I
v;hich replaced the aging C-130A.-'-° This aircraft is a larger C-130 but
still can not transport the Leopard tank. Had Australia waited on the
purchase of a transport, it might have been able to buy the ¥0-14 or
yc-15 which are capable of airlifting Leopard tanks. The YC-14 and YC-15
are currently competing for a production contract in the United States.
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Whereas Australia may appear to have made a major purchase too
hastily in one instance, it often takes a long time in other major pur-
chases. On March 2, 1973, Mr. Lance Barnard, the Minister for Defence,
announced that "a joint technical mission would leave Australia that day
,1 to evaluate proposals for a technical fighter aircraft to replace the
' 19Mirage IIIO aircraft. "-^^ Australia has been dealing with the replace-
ment of the Mirage for nearly 10 years, and the list of possible choices
i has been added to and subtracted from during the entire time. In
November, 1979, Australia narrowed the list to two aircraft and the de-
cision as to which one to purchase may not be made until 1981.
Australia has probably delayed making a decision on the Tactical
Fighter Force because it will cost one and one-half billion dollars for
75 airplanes. This purchase will not only shape the RAAF but may shape
the defence force for the next decade because of funding. In purchasing
a state-of-the-art aircraft, Australia will spend 1.5 billion dollars
on one weapon system after it has spent only 1.17 billion dollars on
\
' on
new capital equipment over the last five years. ^
Although Australia continues to attempt to provide its defence
force with the latest equipment available, there is nothing in logic or
in common sense that makes clear they will always be deterred or defeated
by weapons from higher levels of technology. The United States experi-
ence in Korea and Vietnam clearly illustrate that high technology is not
always the answer. The worst aspect of the desire for state-of-the-art
armament is its impact on Australian defense production.
C. THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE INDUSTRY AS AN ASPECT OF SELF-RELIANCE
A broad statement of the function, main features and performance of
a system required by the Defence Department is known as a Staff
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Requirement. Normally industry, particularly overseas industry, has
advance knowledge of the need for a system before the Staff Requirement
is issued. Australian industry testified before the Joint Committee on
Foreign Affairs and Defence that the
"Staff Requirement becomes influenced by the characteristics of equip-
ment known to be available overseas and that, because existing equip-
ment can thus be acquired within a relatively short timescale, not
only is the possibility of local development ruled out but also the
I
nature of local participation tends to be circumscribed."
I Australia is in the delicate position of wanting to enlarge local defense
industry but buying overseas because it is cheaper and faster.
In the last five years, Australia has spent the greater portion of
capital equipment expenditures overseas. The actual defense expenditure
i on capital equipment, the actual expenditure overseas and the overseas
expenditure as a percentage of total expenditure for the last five years
















The Committee noted from the evidence it received that "the practice
in defence procurement appears to be first to look overseas for equip-
ment before giving attention to the possibility of obtaining it locally."
Because of this philosophy, the Defence Department is creating large




of the strongest industrial nations in its region, defense and industry
have gone their separate ways and "Australia is as much a slave of the
overseas defence equipment suppliers as any underdeveloped country."
Brian Powell, director of the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures, argues
;i that "defence planners seem dazzled by the state-of-the-art equipment that
they think they can buy only from overseas while, on the other hand,
Australian manufacturers relegate defence tenders to their too-hard
trays. "^^
In recent years, the government has required Australian industry
participation in overseas purchases through either a licence or co-
production arrangement. Currently foreign suppliers must provide Aus-
tralian industry with a target level of 30 percent of the contract
' price. It must be pointed out, however, that Australian industry
must bid for this work and Australian participation has averaged below
the 30 percent requirement because of local disinterest, as there are
no long term incentives for the industry.
If Australia expects to create a self-reliant core-force that is
capable of expanding to meet threats, it must also create a defence
industry that is capable of expansion. The trend of Australian defense
industry appears to be in the opposite direction. The Joint Committee
on Foreign Affairs and Defence called for better co-ordination and
communication between industry and defense when it noted
"work which should be done in Australia and which would contribute to
the technology base is being lost because the extent, nature, and
phasing of Australian participation is being determined without the
benefit of an industry input. A further concern of industry is that
by itself it is unable to identify the capabilities and resources
that are needed for defence purposes and hence sensibly to forward
plan its structure and facilities. "^"^
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In most literature dealing with defense, it is noted that Australia's
geographic location with reference to its developing neighbors must
always be remembered. Australia shares a tropical climate with geograph-
ically convenient potential customers for defense equipment. Australia
has the intermediate technology level that is appropriate for developing
nations. Were Australia to become a defense equipment supplier for its
region, industry would have the long term interest in developing defense
28industries.
' D. DETERRENCE
The 1978 Official Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia stated
that "Australia owes it to herself to be able to mount a national defence
29
effort that would maximise the risks and costs to any aggressor."
Although 'deterrence' is not addressed per se, this concept is one of
deterrence.. Glen Snyder maintains that
"The object of military deterrence is to reduce the probability of
enemy military attacks, by posing for the enemy a sufficient likely
prospect that he will suffer a net loss as a result of the attack,
or at least a higher net loss or lower net gain than would follow
j
from his not attacking."
Although deterrence is not a new concept, it is new within the context
of the Australian Defence Force.
! The Chief of Defence Force Staff, Admiral Synnot, stated as recent-
ly as June 1979 that "there is no particular threat in our region which
has sufficient credibility to determine the shape and size of our defence
o 1force." What would determine the shape and size of the Australian
^ defense force is the disproportionate response aspect of deterrence.
T Disproportionate response jtiakes aggression very expensive to the
aggressor. It requires a progressive increase in military capabilities
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which, in turn, requires an aggressor to respond disproportionately in
terms of cost in order to achieve an advantage. Since Australia's neigh-
bors are relatively poor, Australia could build a versatile defense
force that would require its neighbors to spend above the level of which
they are capable in order to gain an advantage.
Much literature on Australian defense indicates that this is basically
what Australia is attempting in its commitment to purchasing state-of-the-
art weapon systems. In equipping itself with high technology weaponry,
Australia must not lose sight of the fact that its defense force must
be balanced if it is to become and remain credible. This is to say that
sophistication of the order of the F-18 or F-16, at 1.5 billion dollars
for a fleet of 75 aircraft, may be more than necessary to require any
threat to respond disproportionately. If the F-18 or F-15 is purchased
at the expense of equipment required for the Army and Navy to be a cred-
ible force, then a threat directed against a weak area in the Army or
Navy may require Australia to respond disproportionately.
Australia's current policy of having an expandable core-force requires
long lead time in order to be viable. One aspect of disproportionate
response is that Australia would force a potential aggressor into sub-
stantial lead time for the acquisition and development of capabilities
required to infringe on Australia's sovereignty. Not only would the
lead time be siibstantial but much of the capability would have to be
purchased, which in turn would provide the Australian government a clear
threat for which to plan and expand forces if necessary.
The force structure that will provide adequate deterrence is a major
question in Australian defense today. It is argued that Australia's
primary defense is its surrounding oceans. If Australia can develop a
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force that can protect its shores out to 600 NM, then any force attempt-
ing to land in Australia would require aircraft and long range warships
which employ the most expensive and sophisticated technology. How Aus-
tralia can be defended 600 NM away from the coast is one of the major
questions facing defense planners today.
HMAS Melbourne, the Australian aircraft carrier, is due to be
retired in 1985. With the loss of this ship Australia will lose a very
versatile portion of its defense force. The decision as to whether or
not Melbourne v;ill be replaced has not been made. There are several
options available for a replacement: 1) a through deck, cruiser costing
$700-800 million with aircraft, 2) a Harrier Carrier costing $400-500
million with aircraft, or 3) a "Woolworth" carrier costing $300-400
million with aircraft. -^-^ Defence planners are now faced with determin-
ing which purchase will give Australia a credible balanced force. If
$1.5 billion dollars are spent on the TFF, the carrier capability may
be retired in 1985.
The strategic debate which began in the early 1970 's will continue
into the 1980 's. It has created an awareness of defense, and many
needed improvements have been made in the 1970 's. The strategic debate
has given Australian defense a sense of direction and an understanding
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Australian defense historically has been an appendage of the British
Commonwealth security interests in Southeast Asia. A member of the Common-
wealth, Australia concerned itself with economic development instead of
E
defense until the late 1930 's. As World War II approached, Australia
became keenly interested in the viability of the concepts that formed
the foundation of its security. The quick fall of Singapore and Malaysia
to the Japanese brought home to Australia that its security interests
r
must not be entrusted to other nations.
I The United States required Australia's strategic position in the
South Pacific in order to launch a counter-offensive against the Japan-
I
' ese, and the relationship between the United States and Australia has
remained firm since. As the war neared its end, Australia began a system-
atic attempt to develop a security arrangement that it could help mold
!
for Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Australian attempts at such
a security arrangement were not fruitful, but Australia was able to in-
fluence the creation of the United Nations through its envoy, H. V. Evatt.
Shortly before the Japanese peace treaty in 1952, Australia entered
into a security arrangement with New Zealand and the United States.
This arrangement was called ANZUS and it became the foundation of Aus-
tralian defense policy. Australia also entered into the Australia, New
Zealand and Malaysia agreement, which was a security arrangement that
included Great Britain.
Great Britain and the United States have long been Australia's
"great and powerful friends", the bottom line in Australian security.
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Australia fought alongside both nations in World War II, with the
United States in Korea and Indo-china, and with Great Britain in Malaysia.
Because Australian security was so closely linked to the United States
and Great Britain it developed a defense policy known as the "Forward
Defence" and structured its military services so that they would be capa-
ble of augmenting the forces of the major power.
I
It was during the period of the "Forward Defence" that Australia was
fighting in Southeast Asia with the United States and Great Britain.
f
The "Forward Defence" called for the defeat of a threat to Australian
security as far away from the continent as possible. During this period
Australia perceived its threat to be Communism that would engulf Indo-
china and then sweep down the Malay peninsula to Indonesia and then on to
Australia. The ending of the Vietnam War broke this threat perception
' that had lasted for 20 years.
In the late 1960 's, Great Britain announced that it would remove its
military capabilities from East of Suez, as it had become too expensive
to maintain its power in Southeast Asia. The United States also announced
the Guam or Nixon Doctrine which called on the nations of Southeast Asia
and the South Pacific to do more for their own security. With this change
in the balance of power, Australia was faced with a re-evaluation of its
security interests.
Australia has determined that it has no foreseeable threat and this
threat perception has created problems for defense planners. Without a
threat it is difficult to develop a force structure, as there are no
guidelines for force capabilities. The lack of a threat also has made
Australians feel that defense matters can be put aside, allowing financial
support to go to other interests such as social welfare.
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For several years now the leaders of the defense establishment have
been saying that "At a time of low or indeterminate threat, strategic
guidance cannot be expected to be sufficiently specific to enable us
to determine the force structure." Because of this lack of threat,
in the last decade Australia has used catch-word identifiers to describe
its defense policy.
The "Forward Defence" strategy was followed by "Continental Defence"
or "Fortress Australia." The latter two identifiers were not especially
\
good descriptions of Australian defense, as they implied isolationism.
Australia was not only not practicing isolationism in the 1970 's, it was
f
actively participating in the efforts to provide stability in its "Near
North" neighborhood. The "Continental Defence" and "Fortress Australia"
,
were discarded for the force-in-being.
Force-in-being is the term used to denote Australian defense capa-
bilities while it attempts to define and develop the core-force. Australia
is pursuing a defense policy based on a core-force which is a small, well-
equipped and highly trained force that can meet the spectriom of Australia's
low-level threats. The core-force will provide the expertise necessary
for expansion should Australia be faced with a serious threat requiring
mobilization.
The core-force concept does, however, suffer from conceptual problems.
The core-force requires superior knowledge of threats and threat lead-
times to be efficient. Yet it is Australia's inability to identify threats
that has forced the Australian military into the core-force.
The core-force is to be equipped with state-of-the-art weapon systems.
Because Australia has such a small defense budget and, by extension, a
smaller budget for capital equipment, defence contracts do not provide
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Australian industry with long term incentives to bid for them. As a
result, Australian defense industry is lagging in technological advances.
If Australia is to pursue a policy of self-reliance, it is imperative
that its defense industries be built up.
If the well-equipped core-force is going to be a credible deterrent
force, it must possess a balance of the appropriate forces. Since the
early 1970 's, when Great Britain and the United States left the area
militarily, Australia's manpower distribution among the three services
has not changed. The Australian Defence Force Cexcluding conscripts)
2
strength for the last 15 years is as follows:
Navy Airmy Air Force
1965 13428 23534 17720
1966 14633 24583 19358
1967 15764 26721 20130
1968 16294 27152 21564
1969 16758 28044 22712
1970 '17089 28305 22642
1971 16997 28701 22539
1972 16890 29326 22720
1973 17215 31151 22717
1974 16141 30197 21119
1975 16094 31514 21546
1976 15993 31430 21351
1977 16390 31988 21703
1978 16298 31883 21689
1979 16582 31813 21803
As Australia changed from an augmentation force to a self-reliant force,
one would think that the manpower ratios among the services would change.
Such has not been the case.
Australia is an island continent and several Australian strategists
agree that an enemy must be met miles off-shore in order to defend the
continent. This would be done by a combination of naval and air power.
The implication here is that money would be divided among the services
to equip them to fulfill this deterrent role. The net outlay on defence
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Total 324.7 533.1 332.2
Obviously aviation technology is very expensive but knowing that a
threat to Australia would probably be seaborne, it would seem reasonable
that the net outlay on equipment would be more equitable between the RAN
and the RAAF. If Australia purchases a $1.5 billion TFF, this expendi-
ture relationship will probably become even more favorable toward aircraft.
There has been a marked increase in defense interest in Australia
during the last decade. This is evidenced by the many changes that have
been made in the Australian Department of Defence. Australia suffers from
not really knowing exactly how to structure its Defence Force, due to the
lack of threats. Under the existing circumstances, the core-force concept
provides an adequate Defence Force for the existing low-level threats.
Australia is probably correct in the assumption that a fundamental
threat to its security would be met with United States forces as set
forth in the ANZUS Treaty. In response to the other threats, however,
Australia "must sustain a Defence Force which supports [its] diplomacy so
that both in combination effectively deter interference with Australia's
sovereignty by the military forces of a foreign power." Australia has
developed a defense policy that is capable of realization but many diff-
icult decisions lie ahead if proper allocation of scarce defense resources
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SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, NEW-
ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
CANZUS' TREATY)
1 September 1951
The Parties to this Treaty,
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples
and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in
the Pacific Area,
Noting that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to
which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed
forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the
coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed
forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and
security in the Japan Area,
Recognizing that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British
Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as
within the Pacific Area,
Desiring to declare publicly and fo2rmally their sense of unity, so
that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them
stand alone in the Pacific Area, and
Desiring further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense
for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a
more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,
Therefore declare and agree as follows:
ARTICLE I
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United
Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be in-
volved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use of force in any manner incon-
sistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
ARTICLE II
In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty
the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective
self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual
and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
ARTICLE III
The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any
of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security




Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on
any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and
declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with
its constitutional processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall
be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.
Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken
the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and
security.
ARTICLE V
For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties
is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any
of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in
the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the
Pacific.
ARTICLE VI
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affect-
ing in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter
of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
ARTICLE VII
The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign
Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the imple-
mentation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be
able to meet at any time.
ARTICLE VIII
X
Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional
security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations
of more effective means to maintain international peace and security,
the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a
consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associa-
tions of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position
to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security
of that Area.
ARTICLE IX
This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratifi-
cation shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of
Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit,
The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the




This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease
to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after
notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will infonn
the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.
ARTICLE XI
This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the archives
of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be





AUSTRALIAN ORDER OF BATTLE
ARMY: Uniformed personnel, 31,813
1 infantry division
3 task fore HQ.
1 armed regiment
1 reconnaissance regiment
1 armoured personnel carrier regiment
5 infantry battalions
1 Special Air Service regiment
4 artillery regiments CI medium, 2 field, 1 air defence!
1 aviation regiment
3 field engineer regiments
1 field survey regiment
2 signals regiments
2 transport regiments
1 air transport support regiment
103 Leopard medium tanks; 791 M-113 armoured personnel carriers;
34 5.5-in guns; 254 lOSram howitzers; 66 M-40 106mm recoilless
launchers; Redeye, 8 Rapier surface-to-air missiles; 17 Porter,
10 Nomad aircraft; 50 Bell 206B-1 helicopters; 32 watercraft.
(On order, 12 Rapier surface-to-air missiles, 10 Blindfire air
defence radar.)
Deployment: Egypt CU.N. Emergency Force/U.N. Truce Supervisory
Organization): 10; India/Kashmir CUNMOGIP) : 6.
Reserves: 21,762 (with training obligation) in combat support,
logistic, and training units.
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NAVY: Uniformed personnel, 16,582 Cincluding Fleet Air Arm).
6 Oxley COberon) sxihmarines.
1 aircraft carrier Ccarries 8 A-4, 6 S-2, 10 helicopters)
.
3 Perth anti-submarine warfare destroyers with Tartar surface-to-
air missiles, Ikara anti-submarine warfare missiles.
1 modified Daring destroyer.
6 River frigates with Seacat surface-to-air missiles/surface-to-
surface missiles, Ikara anti-submarine warfare missiles.
1 training ship.
1 coastal minesweeper.
2 modified British Ton coastal jninehunters
.
12 Attack patrol boats.
1 Fleet replenishment ship.
1 destroyer tender.
6 landing craft.
(On order: 3 FFG7 frigates, 1 amphibious heavy lift ship,
15 PCF patrol craft.)
Fleet Air Arm: 21 combat aircraft.
1 fighter-bomber squadron with 7 A-4G Skyhawk.
2 anti-submarine warfare squadrons with 3 S-2E, 11 S-2G Tracker
(5 in reserve) , 2 HS-748 electronic counter-measures training
aircraft.
1 anti-submarine warfare/search and rescue helicopter squadron
with 5 Sea Kings, 6 Wessex 31B,
1 helicopter squadron with 5 Bell UH-lH, 2 Bell 206B.
1 training squadron with 8 MB-326H, 3TA-4G, 4 A-4G.
2 HS-748 transports.
Bases: Sydney, Jervis Bay, Brisbane, Cairns, Darwin, Cockburn
Sound.
Reserves; 1,Q37 (with training obligations!.
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AIR FORCE; 21,803 uniformed personnel; 115 combat aircraft.
2 strike/reconnaissance squadrons with 20 F~111C.
3 interceptor/fighter, ground-attack squadrons with 48
Mirage IIIO.
1 reconnaissance squadron with 13 Canberra B20.
2 maritime reconnaissance squadrons: 1 with 10P-3B Orion;
1 with 10P-3C.
5 training squadrons: 2 with 24C-130E/H; 2 with 22DHC-4;
1 with 2 BAC-111, 2 HS-748, 3 Mystere 20, 2 Boeing 707-338C.
5 transport flights with 16 C-47,
1 Forward Air Controller flight with 6 CA-25.
1 operational conversion unit with 14 Mirage IIIO/D.
1 helicopter transport squadron with 6 CH-47 Chinook
(6 more in reserve)
.
3 utility helicopter squadrons with 45 UH-IB/H Iroquois.
Trainers including 80MB-326, 8 HS-748T2, 37 .CT-4 Airtrainer.
Sidewinder, R.530 air-to-air missiles.
(28 Mirage IIIO/D in reserve.)
Deployment: Malaysia/Singapore; 2 squadrons with Mirage IIIO,
1 flight with C-47, UH-lH helicopter; Egypt
CUN Emergency Force/UN Truce Supervisory Organ-
ization) : 1 flight with UH-lH helicopter.
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